

Authoritarianism, Redistribution, and Ethnic Diversity*

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Abstract

Authoritarian predispositions are often related to support for social welfare programs, despite being key predictors of social conservatism and prejudice. Existing research argues that the ability of these programs to provide security and certainty explains their appeal to authoritarians. While acknowledging this perspective, we argue that authoritarians also possess a genuine cooperative orientation contingent on social conformity. Therefore, we predict that authoritarians will support egalitarian policies when the salience of diversity is low, but will withdraw their support when salience is high. We also predict that this effect will be limited to ethnic majorities, since only they should view increasing diversity as a threat to social cohesion. We find support for this prediction using two longitudinal measures of ethnic diversity and two cross-national surveys. We also show that authoritarians are more likely to reciprocate cooperation in a trust game involving real money, but withdraw cooperation when they are primed with culturally distant migrants.

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1 Introduction

Disagreement over the proper distribution of resources is central to politics. Understanding the nature and origins of conflicts over resource distribution has therefore been a long-standing goal in political science (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2001; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Lupu and Pontusson 2011). In recent years, much attention has been focused on ethnic diversity as a factor that shapes support for redistribution (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013). To address potential endogeneity issues, many studies of this relationship have turned to immigration as a proxy for ethnic diversity. This has also allowed researchers to take advantage of the increases in migration to Europe from the Middle East and Africa. Recent reviews of this research find consistent evidence that ethnic diversity (immigration) is negatively associated with support for redistribution (Achard and Suetens 2023; Alesina and Tabellini 2024).¹ At the same time, many questions remain regarding the mechanisms by which exposure to immigrants influences people’s economic and political attitudes. For example, a paper by Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport (2021) found that the impact of immigration is stronger when immigrants came from Middle Eastern countries and had low skills and was more pronounced among people on the political right and center-right. Some research also suggests that cultural factors are more important than economic factors in responses to immigration (Alesina and Tabellini 2024).² However, there have been few direct tests of hypotheses concerning the individual level dynamics that link immigration and redistribution attitudes. Most studies in this area have not specified the psychological processes underlying these relationships or used the data necessary to examine micro-level processes.

In this paper, we discuss one mechanism that can account for at least some of the observed relationship between diversity, immigration, and redistributive preferences: authoritarianism. We offer a conceptualization of authoritarianism that predicts a positive relationship between authoritarian predispositions and support for redistribution in relatively homogeneous societies. As the salience of diversity increases, that positive relationship should disappear or become negative. We present three tests of

¹Some of these studies use proxies for economic attitudes such as support for right-wing parties.

²Hainmueller and Hopkins’ (2014) review of studies in political science also concludes that reactions to immigration are based on cultural factors with little evidence that economic competition matters. They argue that better theories are needed to understand how cultural factors condition public responses to immigration.

these hypotheses using cross-national data, within-nation estimates in Europe, and a survey experiment paired with an incentivized economic game.

2 Authoritarianism and Economic Attitudes

For almost a century, social scientists have sought to explain why people support parties and policies that restrict individual freedom. An important body of research argues that some people are psychologically predisposed to authoritarianism and that this predisposition is rooted in the importance that people assign to values of social conformity and individual autonomy (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). All people support these goals to some extent – everyone wants at least some choice in how they live their life, and everyone cares at least a little bit about how chaotic and bewildering their social environment is (Gray and Durrheim 2013). But authoritarians, due to their psychological needs for order and certainty, are especially likely to prioritize conformity over autonomy.³

Because threats to the cohesion of the group are highly disturbing to authoritarians, they tend to lash out against people who deviate from social norms or challenge sources of group authority. Specifically, authoritarians tend to support policies that punish or restrict the behavior of minority and out-group members (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Duckitt 2001; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Peterson, Doty, and Winter 1993; Stenner 2005). In the United States, authoritarians hold conservative views on social issues related to religion, sex, drug use, crime, and immigration, but are less consistent in their orientation towards economic issues related to redistribution and social welfare (Cizmar et al. 2014; Feldman and Johnston 2014). Some scholars have interpreted this as evidence that authoritarianism is only directly relevant for the development of attitudes toward social policy, with spillover into the economic domain occurring when economic policies become associated with disliked out-groups or when political elites explicitly package social and economic policies (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Johnston and Wronski 2015). In this view, authoritarianism should be unrelated to economic attitudes or related to right-wing economic attitudes, depending on the political context.

Contrary to these expectations, survey data collected outside the United States has uncovered relationships between authoritarianism and left-wing economic attitudes. Analyzing data from the second and third waves of the World Values Survey

³Duckitt (2022) notes that researchers sometimes conflate social conformity values with manifest support for authoritarianism. Unless otherwise noted, we use the word authoritarian as a shorthand for a person who is psychologically predisposed to develop authoritarian sentiments, rather than a person who endorses authoritarian policies.

(WVS) spanning 59 nations, Stenner (2005, 2009) finds a small negative correlation between authoritarianism (measured using child-rearing values) and a composite including items tapping opposition to income equality, a preference for private rather than public ownership of businesses, and a belief in individual responsibility for public welfare. Malka and colleagues (2014; 2019) replicate these results in the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS using a measure of authoritarianism (what they call “needs for security and certainty”) constructed from responses to the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al. 2001). Using data from the fourth and eighth rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), Arikan and Sekercioglu (2019) find that authoritarianism (again measured using the PVQ) is a substantial and robust predictor of support for old-age, healthcare, and unemployment benefits in 27 European countries.

In a series of studies in the U.S., Johnston and colleagues (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017; Ollerenshaw 2024; Ollerenshaw and Johnston 2022) show that a closed personality orientation – which includes authoritarianism as a major component – has differential effects on economic attitudes contingent on political awareness and elite messaging. Among people with closed personalities who are high in awareness, antigovernment rhetoric from Republican politicians leads to a negative relationship between closed personality and support for liberal economic policies. Importantly, among the less politically aware, Johnston et al. argue that “there is a natural tendency for closed citizens to support an active role for the government in the economy” (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017, p. 14). Jedinger and Burger (2019) report similar findings in a representative Austrian sample, suggesting that this pattern is not unique to the United States. Malka and colleagues and Johnston, Lavine, and Federico suggest that the contingent effects of authoritarianism on economic preferences are a function of political culture and elite discourse. We supplement this explanation with another perspective on the dynamics of authoritarianism.

3 Authoritarians as Worry Cooperators

Early research on the characteristics of fascist party supporters popularized the view that authoritarians are psychologically maladjusted and antisocial (Adorno et al. 1950; Reich 1946[1933]). In contrast, anthropological research suggests that the key components of the authoritarian personality — adherence to convention, submission to authority, and aggression toward norm violators — are commonplace in every society on earth and constitute basic, innate components of human social behavior (Boehm 1999; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1988, pp. 314-320). Given its widespread presence in our species and apparent social functionality, some researchers have wondered

whether authoritarianism was favored at some point by natural selection⁴

Kessler and Cohrs (2008) argue that authoritarianism was selected for its ability to foster coordination and cooperation in ancestral human groups. According to this account, people who impose social conformity improve the ability of their group to cooperate. By helping to promulgate highly specific and restrictive group norms regulating religious practice, clothing, speech, and behavior and punishing those who deviate from them, authoritarians force their fellow group members to join them in costly norm adherence. In doing so, they create a social environment in which easily observable but hard to fake signals indicate that a person has already invested quite a bit in the group and shares the knowledge, values, and intentions of its members (Bulbulia and Sosis 2011; Sosis, Kress, and Boster 2007; Sosis and Bressler 2003). This shared worldview minimizes the chances of conflict or misunderstanding and makes it much easier to reap the benefits of cooperation (McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003; Skyrms 2004). As McElreath and colleagues argue, “social behavior in groups is regulated by norms in such a way that interactions between individuals who share beliefs about how people should behave yield higher payoffs than interactions among people with discordant beliefs” (2003, p. 122).

Because cooperative individuals are vulnerable to free riders, the first innate cooperative orientations must have combined a genuine desire to cooperate with an even stronger desire to avoid being cheated (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Hibbing and Alford 2004) — what Boehm (1999, p. 214) calls “vigilant sharing.” This hypothetical proto-cooperative orientation shares a striking resemblance to the behavior of individuals who score high on measures of authoritarianism. When Stenner (2005) conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of extreme authoritarians, she was surprised to find that a quarter of these interviewees complained bitterly (and incorrectly) that they had not been paid for an earlier interview. Yet, compared to low authoritarians, high authoritarians report a lack of dishonest or manipulative behavior, a willingness to contribute to group efforts, a desire to maintain close relationships with similar others, and altruism toward family members (Heylen and Pauwels 2015; Lee et al. 2010; Sibley et al. 2010; Sinn and Hayes 2018). And while it is plausible that authoritarians overreport prosocial qualities in surveys, a study by

⁴By the same token, the fact that (a) people vary widely in their predisposition towards authoritarianism and (b) this predisposition is substantially heritable suggests that recent selection on this trait has been relatively weak (Ludeke and Krueger 2013; Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). As the intensity of selection on a trait wanes, stretches of the genome that influence its development are expected to accumulate random mutations that cause their bearers to manifest the trait in more or less reliable ways (O’Connor et al. 2019). For comparison, characteristics that must develop with excellent fidelity if a person is to stand a good chance of passing on their genes - for example having two eyes - are not heritable because disruptive mutations are rarely passed on.

Ludeke, Tagar, and DeYoung (2016) comparing self- and other-reported personality finds no evidence that authoritarians exaggerate their level of agreeableness.⁵ Additionally, Arian (2023) finds that authoritarians are uniquely sensitive to threats to the safety of the group, as opposed to the self, consistent with Stenner’s argument that authoritarians are “relentlessly sociotropic” (2005, p. 32). Thus, authoritarians’ fear of being cheated by norm violators appears to coincide with a genuine, if circumscribed, cooperative orientation.

This evolutionary perspective turns authoritarianism on its head. In this view, the social conformity sought by authoritarians is a prerequisite for cooperation within groups, rather than an end that should be pursued at cooperation’s expense. If this argument is correct, then the achievement of strong group consensus built on norm adherence should also trigger cooperative orientations among authoritarians toward members of their ingroup. Support for economic policies that widely benefit the ingroup should therefore be supported by those high in authoritarianism as a reflection of ingroup cooperation. These policies could be redistributive, to share societal benefits more equally, or social safety nets, to protect ingroup members from unforeseen hardship. For example, Macdonald (2022) shows that framing a program like social security in the U.S. as providing benefits for people who have contributed to society through a lifetime of hard work can generate support from those high in authoritarianism.

4 Ethnic Diversity

If cooperative attitudes among authoritarians are a function of the successful enforcement of ingroup norms, they should be undermined in situations where there is a perception of the breakdown of social conformity. Increasingly, social diversity is the rule rather than the exception in most societies, much to the chagrin of authoritarians (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Van Assche et al. 2019; Velez and Lavine 2017). Perhaps the most salient threat to group conformity is ethnic diversity, which often reflects differences in appearance, behavior, and beliefs. Ethnic heterogeneity across space is negatively related to redistribution, prosocial behaviors, trust, and social capital (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Putnam 2007), consistent with the withdrawal of cooperation by authoritarians in the face of mounting diversity (Velez and Lavine 2017). Two examples of this pat-

⁵Ludeke, Tagar, and DeYoung (2016) do find that authoritarians exaggerate their conscientiousness and lack of openness, consistent with the idea that people over-report politically congenial attributes (Bakker, Lelkes, and Malka 2021). Thus, the null result for agreeableness is unlikely to be a false negative.

tern are the rise of “welfare chauvinism” in Europe and the Tea Party movement in the United States. In both cases, voters who support certain forms of government assistance have responded to the increasing visibility of ethnic minorities by railing against social welfare programs that allegedly benefit those undeserving of help (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Oesch 2008; Parker and Barreto 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2016). At the individual level, humans intuitively categorize one another as coalition members based on ethnic markers such as accent (Pietraszewski and Schwartz 2014b,a), as predicted by evolutionary models of cooperation (McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003). These findings suggest that ethnic homogeneity should play a crucial role in satisfying authoritarians that they are living in a cohesive, norm-bound social environment, drawing out their latent predisposition towards cooperation. Ethnic heterogeneity, meanwhile, should undermine cooperative orientations among authoritarians as social diversity leads to fears of a breakdown in shared norms and social conformity. This should provoke those high in authoritarianism to withdraw support for left-wing economic policies.

5 Hypotheses

The social conformity conceptualization of authoritarianism therefore predicts that in relatively homogeneous societies authoritarianism should be positively related to support for social welfare programs that provide benefits for needy ingroup members. We do not deny the potential effects of other factors that previous research has identified as moderators of the authoritarianism-economic liberalism relationship (elite rhetoric, salience of the left-right dimension). However, *ceteris paribus*, we predict that there should be a positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for social welfare in relatively homogeneous societies.

As nations start to grow more diverse – most likely due to immigration – authoritarians will experience a threat to social conformity. Growing ethnic diversity will also mean that social welfare benefits will flow, in part, to people who authoritarians do not consider to be part of their traditional ingroup. We therefore predict that as homogeneous societies experience an increase in diversity, the positive relationship between authoritarianism and economic liberalism will disappear or even become negative (if authoritarians see social welfare benefits disproportionately going to ethnic minorities). In contrast, we argue that authoritarians who do not identify with a majority ethnic group should be less motivated to defend prevailing cultural norms (those associated with the majority group) and hence less likely to perceive diversity as a threat to social cohesion. Therefore, our theory predicts that increasing diversity should only impact economic attitudes among authoritarians who identify

with majority ethnic groups.

It is unclear what this perspective predicts for nations with a long history of diversity. On the one hand, the continuing presence of diversity may serve as an ongoing threat to authoritarians that undermines ingroup cooperation and prosocial attitudes. It is also possible that a long history of diversity may reduce the degree to which it threatens authoritarians. And cultural assimilation across generations may reduce many of the overt signs of social norm violation from descendants of immigrant groups (Green and Staerklé 2013). Although we utilize two datasets that allow us to examine changes in diversity over time, neither extends back far enough to capture the early stages of growth in minority populations in countries that have a long history of ethnic diversity. We therefore do not make a prediction for the relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution in these cases.

6 Data and Methods

We test our hypotheses across several different samples and measurement strategies (Table 1). First, we combine responses from two large, cross-national time-series surveys with two different measures of annual country-level ethnic diversity. We use data from rounds 1-9 (2002-2020) of the European Social Survey (ESS) and waves 5-6 (2005-2013) of the World Values Survey (WVS), because these data collections overlap with the availability of ethnic diversity data and include items that allow us to measure authoritarianism and support for redistribution. Both surveys also include information about respondents' ethnic identities, allowing us to test whether members of ethnic majority groups are uniquely responsive to changes in diversity. We also test our hypotheses using an experiment paired with an incentivized economic game in a nationally representative Dutch sample. In October 2011, the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) fielded two survey modules to their household panel. In one module, participants saw one of four randomly selected immigrant profiles – the immigrant was either French-Canadian, Colombian, Libyan, or Pakistani (see Turper et al. 2015). In the other study, participants played a one-shot trust game in which they chose to reward or betray an anonymous counterpart, earning real money based on their decisions (see Trautmann, van de Kuilen, and Zeckhauser 2013). Roughly eighty percent of the LISS panelists viewed the immigration vignette before playing the trust game. The remaining twenty percent completed the trust game before viewing the immigration vignette. We exploit this unintentional randomization to identify the causal effect of priming immigration from western or non-western countries on authoritarians' cooperative orientations.

Table 1: Hypothesis Tests

Research Question	Data	Sample	Diversity Salience	Authoritarianism	Dependent Variable
Is authoritarianism associated with support for redistribution, conditional on low salience of ethnic diversity?	ESS	$N = 191,806$ 25 countries 2002–2020 $N = 160,951$ 32 countries 2002–2013	Non-EU Immigrants Arrived in Past Decade Per Capita Net Change in Ethnic Fractionalization Over Past Decade	Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al. 2001)	Incomes should be made more equal
	WVS	$N = 94,525$ 57 countries 2005–2013	Net Change in Ethnic Fractionalization Over Past Decade	Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al. 2001)	Incomes should be made more equal Government should do more to provide for everyone
Is authoritarianism associated with cooperative behavior, conditional on the absence of ethnic diversity cues?	LISS	$N = 761$ Netherlands 2011	Immigrant Vignette Experiment	Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach 1973)	Reward (v. betray) cooperative partner in an incentivized game

6.1 Individual-Level Variables

To measure support for redistribution in the ESS, we use an item that asks respondents to rate their agreement or disagreement with the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” on a five-point scale. To measure support for redistribution in the WVS, we use two items that ask respondents to place themselves on ten-point scales bounded by opposing statements about economic policy. The first asks respondents to choose between the statements “Incomes should be made more equal” and “There should be greater incentives for individual effort.” The second asks respondents to choose between the statements “Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” and “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (ethnic majorities: mean within-nation-year $\rho = 0.251$, standard deviation [SD] = 0.117; ethnic minorities: $\rho = 0.294$, SD = 0.271). In LISS, we use respondents’ behavior in a trust game to measure their cooperative orientation. We discuss this design in more detail in a later section.

We measure authoritarian predispositions by subtracting respondents’ endorsement of autonomy values from their endorsement of conformity values (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003). Based on previous research (Arikan and Sekercioglu 2019; Claassen and McLaren 2021), we measure autonomy and conformity values in the ESS and WVS using the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al. 2001). Following Arikan and Sekercioglu (2019), we average the tradition, conformity, and security items to measure endorsement of conformity values and average the stimulation, self-direction, and hedonism items to measure endorsement of autonomy values. We then

subtract respondents’ autonomy scores from their conformity scores. In LISS, we apply the same procedure to items from the Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach 1973), which we describe in more detail in a later section.

We also categorize respondents according to whether they are members of a majority ethnic group. In the ESS, we use respondents’ subjective perception of whether they belong to the same racial or ethnic group as most people in their country. In the WVS, we use respondent’s self-reported ethnic identity because this measure is available in all waves. Response options were country-specific and required that we judge whether each ethnic group constituted a majority. In cases where two or more ethnic groups formed large pluralities (e.g., Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia), we coded each group as a majority. In most Latin American countries, it was not possible to definitively link self-descriptors (e.g., mestizo, dark, light) to objective indicators of population size. Therefore, we categorized all non-African-descended and non-Indigenous respondents as majority group members (exceptions to this rule included countries in which indigenous groups form clear cultural and numeric majorities, e.g., Bolivia). Our coding of the WVS ethnicity data can be found in Appendix C in the online supplementary materials.

6.2 Country-Level Variables

6.2.1 Measuring the Salience of Ethnic Diversity

To capture the salience of ethnic diversity in European nations in the ESS data, we calculate the share of a country’s population made up of people who emigrated from a non-European Union member state during the past 10 years. We use this metric rather than the absolute number of immigrants because (a) immigrants may assimilate to local cultures over time and (b) native-born residents may acclimate to a given level of diversity over time. We use estimates from Claassen (2024), who combines data from several administrative sources to estimate the annual number of immigrants arriving in 30 European countries. We use the version of this measure that counts only people who held citizenship in a country outside of the EU or United Kingdom before emigrating. We scale the immigration variable so that each unit corresponds to an additional 1% of the population made up of immigrants from non-EU countries who arrived within the past decade.

Because Claassen’s data cover only a subset of European countries in a limited number of years, we supplement our immigration-based measure with another measure of ethnic diversity: The change in a country’s ethnic fractionalization during the past 10 years. Ethnic fractionalization indices capture the likelihood that two people selected at random from a population will belong to different ethnic groups (Easterly

and Levine 1997). Fractionalization is calculated by adding the squared proportions of a population belonging to distinct ethnic groups and subtracting the total from 1. This produces a measure bounded at 0 and 1, where 0 means that every person in the population belongs to the same ethnic group and 1 means that every person in the population belongs to a different ethnic group. We used Drazenova’s fractionalization estimates (2020), which are available annually for most countries from 1945 to 2013, to calculate the net change in fractionalization during the previous decade. The resulting fractionalization variable is bounded at -1 and 1, where -1 means that a country went from maximally diverse to completely homogenous during the past 10 years and 1 means that a country went from completely homogenous to maximally diverse during the past 10 years.

6.2.2 Other Country-Level Variables

Prior research finds that the relationship between psychological predispositions and political attitudes varies by economic development (Malka et al. 2014; Malka, Lelkes, and Soto 2019; Sibley, Osborne, and Duckitt 2012) and post-communist status (Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005; Kossowska and Van Hiel 2003; McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina-Paap 1992; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). In our main analyses, we include a World Bank estimate of gross domestic product and a binary indicator for whether a country was formerly under Communist rule.⁶ In Appendix B in the online supplementary materials we report models including pairwise interactions between GDP and all individual-level variables and models estimated on non-post-Communist countries only. These alternative specifications leave our results substantively unchanged, with one exception (see Tables B1 to B6).⁷ Therefore, we focus on the results from our simpler model specifications here.

7 Cross-National Analyses

Do authoritarians living in relatively ethnically homogeneous societies prefer policies that promote economic equality only to reject redistribution when the salience of

⁶Our GDP data are log transformed annual per capita figures in 2015 US Dollars from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>.

⁷The interaction between change in fractionalization and authoritarianism becomes non-significant among majority respondents in the ESS when we remove post-Communist countries (Tables B3 and B5). However, the interaction between recent immigration and authoritarianism remains statistically significant among majority respondents in the ESS across all alternative specifications.

ethnic diversity increases? To answer this question, we first turn to the ESS data, which include observations spanning 32 European countries and 18 years (2002-2020). We start by estimating four multilevel linear models with country and year random intercepts.⁸ The dependent variable in each model is support for redistribution, scaled to range from 0 to 1. The focal independent variables are authoritarianism, a measure of ethnic diversity salience, and the interaction between authoritarianism and diversity salience. We estimate two models for each of our measures of diversity salience—one among self-identified ethnic majority respondents and one among self-identified ethnic minority respondents. In each model, we control for age, gender, education, income, religiosity, political ideology measured on a ten-point left-right scale, post-communist status, and the log of annual GDP per capita. We also include pairwise interactions between all individual-level control variables and our diversity measures to ensure that our focal interaction results are not driven by demographics, religiosity, or political ideology (cf. Blackwell and Olson 2022; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019; Scheve and Stasavage 2006). We plot the predicted values and marginal effects from the four multilevel models in Figure 1. We report the full output of these models in Table A1 in the online supplementary materials. The solid lines show the relationships between authoritarianism and support for redistribution in times and places where the salience of ethnic diversity is low — at the fifth percentile in the ESS sample, where less than 1% of the population are recent non-EU immigrants and fractionalization has decreased by 0.029 during the past decade. The dashed lines show the same relationship when the salience of ethnic diversity is high — at the ninety-fifth percentile in the ESS sample, where about 9% of the population are recent non-EU immigrants and fractionalization has increased by about one tenth of its scale during the past decade.

The results confirm our hypotheses. Looking first at the solid lines in the top left panels of Figure 1A and 1B, we find a strong positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution among ethnic majority group members when the salience of diversity is low. Moving from the fifth percentile of authoritarianism to the ninety-fifth percentile corresponds to a shift in redistribution preferences of 0.53 standard deviations (SDs) in the immigration model and 0.65 SDs in the fractionalization model (Figure 1A, top left: first difference [FD] = .061, high density interval [HDI] = [.054, .068]; Figure 1B, top left: FD = .077, HDI = [.068, .086]).

⁸Stegmueller (2013) shows that maximum likelihood estimation of multilevel models yields biased estimates of interactions between individual-level and country-level variables. Given that our quantity of interest is a cross-level interaction, we follow Stegmueller in using Bayesian estimation with noninformative priors (Bürkner 2017). We use the frequentist terminology of “statistical significance” throughout for convenience.




Figure 1: Top row: Predicted values of support for redistribution as a function of authoritarianism at high and low levels of ethnic diversity salience. Grey shaded areas are 95% high density intervals (HDIs). Bottom row: First differences evaluated at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of authoritarianism and second differences printed with brackets. Coefficients are median posterior draws with 95% HDIs in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (i.e., HDIs exclude 0). Grey shaded areas show the density of authoritarianism. In each set of four panels, the left-hand panels show estimates for members of the ethnic majority and the right-hand panel show estimates for members of ethnic minorities. Data are from the ESS rounds 1-9 (2002-2020). Full results are in Table A1 and alternative specifications are in Tables B1, B3 and B5.

When the salience of ethnic diversity is high, the effect of authoritarianism shrinks by nearly half in both models, though it remains positive and statistically significant (Figure 1A, top left: $FD = .033$, $HDI = [.024, .041]$; Figure 1B, top left: $FD = .040$, $HDI = [.029, .052]$). To test whether this change is due to highly authoritarian respondents withdrawing their support for redistribution, we calculate the effect of moving from low to high diversity salience at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of authoritarianism. These results appear in the bottom rows of Figure 1A and 1B. In the immigration model, the effect of diversity salience is precisely zero among low authoritarians ($FD = -.000$, $HDI = [-.013, .013]$) but corresponds to a statistically significant 0.25 SD reduction in support for redistribution among high authoritarians ($FD = -.028$, $HDI = [-.041, -.016]$). In the fractionalization model, low authoritarians' support decreases by 0.33 SDs and high authoritarians' support decreases by 0.65 SDs. As shown in the bottom left panels of Figure 1A and 1B, these differences between low and high authoritarians are statistically significant. Consistent with our argument that authoritarians' response to diversity is contingent on their identification with the dominant culture, the salience of diversity has no effect on the relationship between authoritarianism and redistribution among ethnic minorities. This is shown in the right-hand panels of Figure 1A and 1B.⁹ These results obtain whether diversity is measured using immigration or fractionalization.

Next we turn to the WVS data, which spans eight years (2005-2013) and fifty-seven countries across six continents. Because immigration data is unavailable for most of these countries, we focus solely on fractionalization. As before, we estimate multilevel linear models predicting support for redistribution, scaled to range from 0 to 1. We estimate two models — one among members of ethnic majority and plurality groups and one among members of ethnic minority groups.

We plot the predicted values and first differences from these models in Figure 2. The full model output can be found in Table A2 in the online supplementary materials. As before, the solid lines show the relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution in times and places where the salience of ethnic diversity is very low — at the fifth percentile in the WVS sample, where fractionalization has decreased by about 0.06 units in the past decade — and the dashed lines show the relationship where the salience of ethnic diversity is very high — at the ninety-fifth percentile, where fractionalization has increased by about 0.06 units in the past decade.

⁹The interaction terms are statistically significant in both ethnic majority models (Figure 1A, top left: $b = -.010$, $SE = .002$; Figure 1B, top left: $b = -.069$, $SE = .017$) but are not statistically significant in either of the ethnic minority models (Figure 1A, top right: $b = .008$, $SE = .011$; Figure 1B, top right: $b = -.122$, $SE = .070$). See Table A1.




Figure 2: Top row: Predicted values of support for redistribution as a function of authoritarianism at high and low levels of ethnic diversity salience. Grey shaded areas are 95% HDIs. Bottom row: First differences evaluated at the fifth and ninety fifth percentiles of authoritarianism and second differences printed above brackets. Coefficients are median posterior draws with 95% HDIs in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (i.e., HDIs exclude 0). Grey shaded areas show the density of authoritarianism. The left-hand panels show estimates for members of the ethnic majority and the right-hand panel show estimates for members of ethnic minorities. Data are from the WVS waves 5-6 (2005-2013). Full results are in Table A2 and alternative specifications are in Tables B2, B4 and B6.

As in the ESS, the results support our hypotheses. When the salience of ethnic diversity is low, WVS respondents at the ninety-fifth percentile of authoritarianism support redistribution more than those at the fifth percentile – a difference of 0.59 standard deviations ($FD = .077$, $HDI = [.064, .090]$). But when ethnic diversity is salient, this pattern reverses such that highly authoritarian respondents support redistribution 0.11 standard deviations less than those low in authoritarianism ($FD = -.014$, $HDI = [-.027, -.003]$). In contrast, we again find that the salience of ethnic diversity has no effect on the relationship between authoritarianism and redistribution attitudes among ethnic minorities.¹⁰ However, there is one area where the WVS results appear inconsistent with our argument. As the top left panel of Figure 2 shows, the interaction between authoritarianism and diversity salience seems to be driven in part by low authoritarians supporting redistribution more when diversity is salient. But the left-hand side of the authoritarianism distribution is sparse in the WVS sample, making linear extrapolation potentially misleading (Figure 2, bottom left panel). When we calculate the effects of diversity salience at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of authoritarianism, neither difference is significantly different from zero (Figure 2, bottom left panel). Nonetheless, the equivalence test reported in the bottom left panel of Figure 2 shows that the effect of diversity salience is significantly less negative among low authoritarians as compared to high authoritarians, consistent with our hypotheses. Thus, even though the effect of diversity salience among high authoritarians was not significant in the WVS, tests of our predictions regarding differential effects of diversity salience by authoritarianism and ethnic group status were perfectly consistent across two large datasets and, for the ESS data, two different measures of changes in ethnic diversity over time.

Our analyses in this section have used time-series, cross-sectional data. Our estimates thus combine overtime variation within nations with variance between nations. The cross-sectional component of our data leaves open the possibility that unmeasured variables could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. One or more variables associated with ethnic diversity cross-nationally may be responsible for the results we have just presented. To address this concern, we now turn to within-country tests of our hypothesis. By focusing on overtime variation in single nations we are effectively holding constant unmeasured factors that may vary across nations.

¹⁰The interaction term is statistically significant in the ethnic majorities model (top left panel: $b = -.160$; $SE = .019$) but not in the ethnic minorities model (top right panel: $b = -.077$; $SE = .045$). See Table A2.

8 The European Migrant Crisis: A Case Study

According to our theory, authoritarians should continuously update their attitudes toward redistribution as cultural diversity becomes more or less salient. Sudden changes in the visibility of immigrants in one's locale should be particularly threatening to authoritarians' sense of social order. The 2015 European migrant crisis provides a strong test of this prediction.

Starting in 2011, a growing number of Syrians and Libyans fled their countries' civil wars to southern Europe. When the Islamic State invaded Iraq in 2014, what had been a trickle of immigration became an exodus. The number of migrants entering the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland surged from about 300,000 in 2014 to 1.8 million in 2015, a majority of whom were of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi origin (Buonanno 2017). Right-wing populists throughout Europe framed the crisis as an invasion, warning that Islam would displace local cultures if migrants were allowed to stay (Norris and Inglehart 2019, pp. 182-187). However, countries varied considerably in the number of migrants that they received, the timing of their arrival, and the proportion of migrants who resided in the country for an extended period of time. Thus, while all Europeans were aware of the migrant crisis and were exposed to anti-immigrant rhetoric, different European populations encountered migrants in their communities at different times and to different degrees. This variation is reflected in our immigration-based index of diversity salience, which counts only emigrants who took up long-term residence in the destination country.

To explore whether authoritarians react to changes in diversity by withdrawing support for redistribution, we return to the ESS data. Using OLS, we regress economic attitudes on authoritarianism and control variables (including political ideology) separately in each country-round sample.¹¹ These models are estimated only on respondents who identified as members of an ethnic majority. In Figure 3, we plot the marginal effects from these models alongside our immigration-based diversity measure for the ten countries in our sample with the highest per capita rates of first-time asylum applicants in 2015: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.¹² We focus on

¹¹ESS data collections start at irregular intervals and often straddle two consecutive years. As a result, many of the country-year samples are quite small (< 100 observations). Partial pooling reduced the likelihood of overfitting to small country-year samples in our multilevel models, but here it is a greater concern. Therefore, we pool country samples by ESS round rather than year and plot coefficients in the year when data collection was completed.

¹²Countries with similarly high per capita application rates that we cannot analyze due to lack of data are Luxembourg (0.0042), Malta (0.0039), and Bulgaria (0.0028). Data accessed from Eurostat Press Office (2016)

these countries because their shared experience as major destinations for migrants makes them relatively comparable in terms of the salience generated by political discussion and media coverage of the crisis. Yet these countries also differed vastly in the nature of the migrants that they received and the extent to which those migrants were allowed to move freely and interact with the population, and these differences help to illustrate three key aspects of our argument: (1) Among countries that were inundated by asylum applicants, the relationship between authoritarianism and left-wing economic attitudes remained positive or even grew in countries that ultimately expelled most migrants but declined in countries that ultimately accepted most migrants, as seen in the contrast between Hungary on the one hand and Sweden and Germany on the other; (2) Among countries that experienced roughly similar increases in recent non-EU immigrants per capita, it was only where the majority of migrants were culturally dissimilar from the receiving country’s population that the relationship between authoritarianism and economic attitudes shifted, as seen in the contrast between Finland and Norway; (3) The relationship between authoritarianism and economic attitudes responds dynamically to diversity within countries, as seen in the Netherlands, Austria, and, to some extent, in Denmark.

We first turn to the results for Sweden, Germany, and Hungary. Looking first at Hungary, it is striking that the share of the population comprised of recent non-EU immigrants has not changed much during the twenty-first century; in fact, this statistic is nearly identical in 2005 (1.59%) and 2019 (1.62%). This is in part because Hungary did not process the vast majority of asylum applications received in 2015 and 2016, either ferrying migrants to Austria or detaining them near the Serbian border (Eurostat Press Office 2016, 2017b; Human Rights Watch 2015; Smale, Lyman, and Hartocollis 2015). Of the 202,650 first-time asylum applications received during 2015 and 2016, Hungary processed 8,525 and granted just 985 (Eurostat Press Office 2016, 2017a,b).

In contrast, Sweden had already granted residence to hundreds of thousands of migrants of Middle Eastern and East African origin in the decade before the migrant crisis struck (Lindsay 2021). During the peak of the migrant crisis in 2015 and 2016, Sweden received 178,440 first-time asylum applications and granted 103,820 (Eurostat Press Office 2016, 2017a,b). As a result, their population share of recent non-EU immigrants rose from a low of 3.37% in 2002 to 7.71% in 2020. Sweden’s liberal approach to detaining asylum applicants and generous granting of permanent residence meant that immigrants were relatively free to move about the country and hence highly visible in Swedish society (International Detention Coalition 2015; Lindsay 2021).

Germany’s experience was similar to Sweden’s. In 2015 and 2016, Germany




Figure 3: Marginal effects of authoritarianism on support for redistribution in ten European nations. Estimates are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Lines denoting immigrants per capita are local polynomial regression lines. Per capita immigration rates are multiplied by 10 for visual comparison. All models include controls for age, gender, education, income, religiosity, and ideology. Data are from the ESS, ethnic majority respondents only. For full model output see Tables A3 to A12.

received 1,164,065 first-time asylum applications and granted citizenship to 593,425 (Eurostat Press Office 2016, 2017a,b). Consequently, the proportion of recent non-EU immigrants in Germany rose from a low of 3.62% in 2014 to 6.96% in 2020. One obvious difference between Germany and Sweden is that Germany’s share of recent non-EU immigrants declined precipitously from 2002 to 2014 whereas Sweden’s rose steadily. However, nearly a quarter of non-EU immigrants to Germany during the preceding decade were ethnic Germans from former Soviet bloc countries, and the remainder were mostly Eastern European and Balkan refugees (Green 2013). Thus, our metric likely exaggerates the amount of change in diversity salience during this period relative to the increase that began in 2014, which was driven almost entirely by migration from the Middle East. Lastly, Germany too placed few restrictions on asylum seekers’ freedom of movement and declined to pursue deportation of most failed applicants and irregular migrants, leading to widespread public visibility of immigrants (European Migration Network/Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2016, 2017; Kalkmann 2017).

The results shown in Figure 3 suggest that these differences had major consequences for the relationship between people’s psychological predispositions and their economic attitudes. In Hungary, the marginal effect of authoritarianism on support for redistribution fluctuates from year to year but trends upwards overall, rising from .12 in 2005 to .26 in 2019. By contrast, the marginal effect among Swedes declines nearly monotonically between 2003 and 2019, falling from .17 to .04 as the proportion of recently arrived immigrants grows. Similarly, the marginal effect among Germans hovers around .19 from 2003 to 2011 – during which a majority of recently arrived non-EU immigrants were either ethnic Germans or other Eastern Europeans – but falls to .11 in 2013 as the first Syrian refugees begin to arrive and plummets to -.01 by 2019.

Results for Norway, Finland, and Belgium provide evidence from another group of countries with different immigration experiences. In terms of the rate of change in immigration salience, these countries look relatively similar; whereas nearby Sweden’s share of recent immigrants increased by 3.36 percentage points from 2002 to 2020, Norway’s, Finland’s, and Belgium’s increased by 1.85, 1.74, and 1.20 percentage points, respectively. However, Finland is unique in that a plurality of the non-EU migrants granted citizenship there in 2015 were previously citizens of Russia, a country that borders Finland and shares some aspects of its culture and heritage. This was not the case in Norway and Belgium, where the largest groups were Eritrean and Moroccan, respectively (Eurostat Press Office 2017c). Given that ethnic and culturally differences between Fins and Russians are, on average, far less salient than differences between Norwegians and Eritreans or Belgians and Moroccans, we

would expect our diversity measure to have less of an impact in Finland. In line with our expectations, the marginal effect of authoritarianism in Finland remains stable and significantly positive even in the aftermath of the migrant crisis. By contrast, the results for Norway resemble those for Sweden. As the salience of ethnic diversity increased from 2003 to 2019, the marginal effect of authoritarianism dropped from .24 to .02 in Norway and from .08 to -.03 in Belgium.

The results for Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland provide a particularly strong test of our hypothesis. They allow us to check whether the relationship between authoritarianism and egalitarianism becomes more positive when the salience of diversity consistently declines over many years.¹³ Migration to the Netherlands slowed considerably in the early 2000s, such that the country’s share of recently arrived non-EU immigrants had been falling continually for over a decade when the migrant crisis struck. As the visibility of new arrivals fell, the marginal effect of authoritarianism on economic attitudes steadily climbed from .10 in 2003 to .22 in 2015 – only to fall to .0 in 2019. The same pattern appears among Austrians. As the proportion of recent migrants fell from 2007 to 2015, the marginal effect of authoritarianism increased slightly from .19 to .22. But with the influx of migrants, the marginal effect drops to .06 in 2017. The results for Denmark offer mixed support for our hypothesis. From 2005 through 2015, the marginal effect of authoritarianism seems to track the proportion of newly arrived immigrants, first rising from .05 to .19 as the proportion shrinks and then declining to .03 as it begins to grow. However, the marginal effects shoot up to .28 in 2003 and .18 in 2019, when our theory predicts that they should be at their lowest. And in Switzerland, the marginal effect of authoritarianism fluctuates and shows no consistent relationship with the proportion of newly arrived immigrants. Nonetheless, the parameter estimates for Austria and the Netherlands show how responsive those high in authoritarianism are to changes in ethnic diversity in some contexts. The increases in the marginal effect estimates begin to decrease rapidly just as soon as immigration levels begin to rise.

9 Are Authoritarians Worry Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game in the Netherlands

Thus far, we have shown that authoritarians support redistributive policies more than non-authoritarians in times and places where the salience of ethnic diversity is low, but not where the salience of ethnic diversity is high. We argue that this pattern

¹³As mentioned before, Germany’s apparent decline in diversity salience during the early twenty-first century is driven at least in part by the tapering off of ethnic German migration from former Soviet bloc countries (Green 2013).

is due to an underappreciated aspect of the authoritarian predisposition: All else equal, authoritarians prefer to cooperate within norm-bound groups, only adopting a more competitive outlook when they believe that norms are fraying. In the forgoing analyses, we could not observe cooperative behavior directly; instead, we inferred it from authoritarians’ stances on economic policies. Moreover, we did not manipulate the salience of ethnic diversity in these analyses, leaving open the possibility of confounding. Here, we address both shortcomings by testing whether authoritarians’ willingness to betray a cooperative counterpart in a trust game increases in response to experimentally primed ethnic diversity.

Our data come from the Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences (LISS), a panel survey which is fielded to a national probability sample of Dutch households (Scherpenzeel and Das 2011).¹⁴ In October 2011, LISS panelists were invited to participate in up to five studies for compensation, each lasting approximately ten minutes. We focus on panelists who completed two of these studies. In one study, participants played a one-shot game in which they chose to reward or betray an anonymous counterpart, earning real money based on their decisions. The game featured two roles: first mover and second mover. The second mover was told that the first mover chose between two options: allow the second mover to decide how to split €15 or fix the payments at €5 each. For their part, the second mover decided whether to split €15 evenly or take €11, in the event that the first mover gave them the option. Crucially, the second mover was asked to make this choice without knowing which option the first mover had chosen (Trautmann, van de Kuilen, and Zeckhauser 2013). In reality, the LISS panelists who were assigned to play as the first mover did not directly choose how to divide the money; instead, they were asked their beliefs about the distribution of responses by second movers. We therefore focus on panelists assigned to play as second movers, who chose whether to reward or betray a cooperative partner.

In the other study, participants viewed one of four randomly selected migrant profiles before answering questions about immigration policy. Each profile consisted of a vignette describing the potential migrant and a photograph. The migrant was either French-Canadian, Colombian, Libyan, or Pakistani (Turper et al. 2015). We pool the latter three conditions to investigate the effect of viewing a non-Western or Western migrant profile on behavior in the trust game.¹⁵

¹⁴LISS is administered and managed by the non-profit research institute Centerdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands). A user agreement prevents us from sharing the LISS data with third parties. Instructions for how to obtain LISS data can be found here: <https://www.lissdata.nl/use-the-data>.

¹⁵In Table B7, we report models that examine the separate effects of the four migrant profiles.

Of ethnic majority panelists who completed both studies and played as second movers, 681 completed the immigration module before beginning the trust game and 152 completed the trust game before beginning the immigration module.¹⁶ Of these, 637 and 134 completed the Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach 1973) in a module fielded four months earlier, allowing us to measure authoritarianism. Like the Portrait Values Survey used in the ESS and WVS, the Rokeach scale asks respondents to rate the importance of different values. We average the “responsible,” “hardworking,” “clean,” “self-controlled,” “polite,” and “obedient” items to measure endorsement of conformity values and we average the “open-minded,” “independent,” “happy,” “intellectual,” and “creative” items to measure endorsement of autonomy values.

We estimate probit regressions to test our prediction that authoritarians will be more likely behave cooperatively, all else equal, but that diversity salience will depress their cooperative orientations. Our focal predictors are authoritarianism, two binary variables indicating whether the respondent viewed a Western or a Non-Western migrant profile before the trust game, and multiplicative interaction terms for authoritarianism and each of the treatment indicators. We also include the same set of individual-level control variables used in our analysis of the ESS: age, gender, education, income, religiosity, and political ideology. Lastly, we subset to LISS respondents who indicate that they come from a Western ethnic background. To ensure that our results are not driven by omitted interaction bias, we estimate two models – one with just the focal interactions between the treatments and authoritarianism, and one with additional pairwise interactions between the treatments and each control variable.

We report the results of the probit regressions in Table 2. In both specifications, the interaction between authoritarianism and the non-Western migrant treatment is negative and statistically significant, whereas the interaction between authoritarianism and the Western migrant treatment is negative but smaller and not significant. Notably, the magnitude of the interaction between authoritarianism and the non-

The interaction between authoritarianism and the Pakistani migrant profile is consistently statistically significant in these models, but the interactions between authoritarianism and the Canadian, Colombian, and Libyan profiles are not. We think that this result is consistent with our hypothesis, given that Pakistan is arguably the most culturally distant of the four countries from the Netherlands.

¹⁶Most respondents completed the two studies back-to-back. However, because the studies were self-administered over the internet, some panelists waited up to four weeks to complete the trust game after completing the immigration study. To ensure that the time from receiving the treatment to playing the trust game is consistent across conditions, we drop 10 respondents who waited a day or more to play the trust game after completing the immigration module. As we show in Table B8, our results are robust to including these respondents.

Table 2: Diversity Suppresses Cooperative Behavior Among Authoritarians

	DV: Reward (v. Betray)	
Age	0.007(0.003)*	0.015(0.007)*
Female	0.117(0.102)	0.265(0.257)
Education	0.120(0.174)	0.326(0.432)
Income	-0.344(0.361)	-0.957(0.901)
Religiosity	-0.137(0.133)	-0.536(0.345)
Ideology	0.080(0.248)	-0.547(0.751)
Authoritarianism	2.148(1.112)	2.688(1.197)*
Condition: Non-Western Migrant	1.285(0.665)	1.571(0.900)
Condition: Western Migrant	0.605(0.876)	1.078(1.164)
Age \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.010(0.008)
Age \times Western Migrant		-0.011(0.011)
Female \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.159(0.288)
Female \times Western Migrant		-0.166(0.340)
Education \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.386(0.488)
Education \times Western Migrant		0.016(0.569)
Income \times Non-Western Migrant		0.801(1.008)
Income \times Western Migrant		0.372(1.231)
Religiosity \times Non-Western Migrant		0.544(0.383)
Religiosity \times Western Migrant		0.123(0.464)
Ideology \times Non-Western Migrant		0.861(0.811)
Ideology \times Western Migrant		0.271(0.927)
Authoritarianism \times Non-Western Migrant	-2.464(1.248)*	-3.292(1.353)*
Authoritarianism \times Western Migrant	-1.490(1.622)	-1.774(1.725)
Intercept	-1.455(0.623)*	-1.662(0.776)*
<i>N</i>	761	761
Log Likelihood	-520.627	-516.468

Note: Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data are from LISS, ethnic majority respondents only. Alternative specification are in Tables B7 and B8.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Western migrant treatment is robust to controlling for alternative treatment moderators. In fact, none of the other interaction terms are statistically significant. This indicates that the interaction between authoritarianism and treatment condition is not explained by age, gender, education, income, religiosity, or political ideology.

Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of rewarding a cooperative partner from the fully interacted model. Squares indicate predicted probabilities for respondents scoring at the ninety-fifth percentile of authoritarianism and circles represent this quantity for respondents scoring at the fifth percentile of authoritarianism. Consistent with our hypothesis, high authoritarians in the control conditions are significantly more likely than chance to reward a cooperative partner in the trust game (prob. = .67, $p = .022$) but are equally likely to repay cooperation with reward or betrayal when immigration is primed (p 's $> .05$). In contrast, low authoritarians are not significantly more or less likely than chance to reward their partner in any of the three conditions (p 's $> .05$). To further interpret these results, we conduct pairwise tests of the hypothesis that the difference in predicated probabilities between low and high authoritarians differs significantly across conditions. As shown in Figure 4, we find no significant differences between the control and Western migrant conditions ($p = .313$) or between the Western and non-Western migrant conditions ($p = .269$). However, consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant difference between the control and non-Western migrant conditions, such that authoritarians' greater likelihood of rewarding a cooperative partner shrinks by forty percentage points when non-Western immigration is primed ($p = .010$).

10 Conclusions

Why does support for redistribution appear to decline as ethnic diversity grows? Despite a large number of studies offering cross-national support for this relationship, research has so far failed to offer a theoretical framework to understand why some people withdraw support for redistribution and social welfare programs in the face of increasing diversity, largely in the form of mass immigration. In this paper, we have shown how recent advances in our understanding of authoritarianism can provide at least a significant part of the explanation.

The dominant perspective on authoritarianism focuses on its connections to intolerance, prejudice, and ethnocentrism. In this paper, we have argued that, under some circumstances, authoritarianism may also motivate support for social welfare programs that benefit ingroup members. Extending the perspective of authoritarians as wary cooperators, we predicted and found evidence that authoritarianism is positively related to egalitarian attitudes and support for redistribution. The crit-




Figure 4: The probability of rewarding cooperation in an incentivized game varies by authoritarianism and immigration priming. Average predicted probabilities and second differences are calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). Data are from LISS, ethnic majority respondents only.

ical factor that moderates the strength of this relationship is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The social conformity that authoritarians value is threatened by immigration that increases the perception of diversity in society. This in turn reduces authoritarians' support for social welfare and redistributive policies.

We have presented results from three modeling strategies that strongly support these predictions. Estimates from cross-sectional, time-series models with two large datasets yield substantively large positive effects of authoritarianism on measures of redistribution attitudes in nations that have not experienced large increases in immigration. The marginal effect of authoritarianism decreases substantially as immigration increases. Although we speculated that the marginal effects of authoritarianism on redistribution attitudes might become negative in nations with high ethnic diversity, we do not see clear evidence of that in our estimates. There is abundant evidence that those high in authoritarianism respond to growing diversity by becoming more ethnocentric and intolerant; we do not see evidence that they also oppose redistributive policies any more than those low in authoritarianism.

We demonstrate the robustness of these results with estimates from within-nation models. This approach eliminates the threat of unmeasured variables in cross-national estimates and takes advantage of country-specific differences in the amount and timing of immigration. Using ESS data from 2002 to 2020, we show that the marginal effect of authoritarianism on support for redistribution is quite sensitive to changes in immigration. Consistent with estimates from the cross-national data, there is a positive marginal effect of authoritarianism when nations have not experienced significant amounts of immigration in the past decade. As immigration grows, the effect of authoritarianism on redistributive attitudes again declines to near zero. Although we do not have the data needed to adequately examine this, the comparison of Finland, Belgium, and Norway suggests that immigration from very difficult cultures and religions (North Africa and the Middle East in the case of Norway and Belgium) depressed authoritarian support for redistribution, while immigration from a country with a similar culture (Russian immigration to Finland) did not.

We also present evidence from an experiment paired with an incentivized economic game in a nationally representative Dutch sample. When real money is on the line, we find that authoritarians are more likely to reward a stranger who cooperates with them by voluntarily splitting the prize. However, we show that when people are forced to think about ethnically dissimilar immigrants, the likelihood of authoritarians rewarding their partner declines and becomes indistinguishable from that of low authoritarians. This result exactly mirrors the dynamic that we find in our cross-sectional analyses, where increases in diversity salience correspond to less support for redistribution at the high end of authoritarianism, but not at the

low end. Importantly, the experimental findings show that decreases in the positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for social welfare do not depend on elite signaling, as previous research has argued (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017; Malka et al. 2014). We do not dispute the evidence that elite cues may alter the relationship between authoritarianism and redistribution preferences. However, we have shown that simple exposure to a non-Western immigrant was sufficient to eliminate the effect of authoritarianism on ingroup cooperation.

In general, these results support the social cohesion model of authoritarianism that has developed a growing body of empirical support (Feldman and Weber 2023). Those high in authoritarianism prioritize social cohesion over personal autonomy and are sensitive to threats to cohesion. A large body of research has shown that responses to these threats can generate hostility toward the perceived cause of the disruption to social cohesion. As we have shown here, the same motivation can, in stable, homogeneous societies, result in support for economic policies that benefit ingroup members.

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Online Appendix for
“Authoritarianism, Redistribution, and Ethnic Diversity”

A	Full Regression Output for Figures	39
B	Alternative Model Specifications	46
C	Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey	54

A Full Regression Output for Figures

Table A1: Multilevel Linear Models from Figure 1 (ESS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	Non-EU Immigration				Δ Fractionalization			
	Majorities		Minorities		Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.927 (.131)	1.00	1.039 (.243)	1.00	-.687 (.156)	1.00	.803 (.189)	1.00
Age	.001 (.000)	1.00	.001 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female	.025 (.002)	1.00	.010 (.012)	1.00	.024 (.002)	1.00	.019 (.006)	1.00
Education	-.070 (.005)	1.00	-.066 (.024)	1.00	-.079 (.003)	1.00	-.041 (.013)	1.00
Income	-.093 (.004)	1.00	-.056 (.022)	1.00	-.084 (.003)	1.00	-.067 (.012)	1.00
Religiosity	.015 (.004)	1.00	-.017 (.021)	1.00	.005 (.003)	1.00	-.001 (.011)	1.00
Ideology	-.273 (.006)	1.00	-.186 (.029)	1.00	-.188 (.003)	1.00	-.118 (.014)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.168 (.012)	1.00	.077 (.056)	1.00	.174 (.008)	1.00	.210 (.030)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	.005 (.002)	1.00	-.003 (.008)	1.00	.027 (.015)	1.00	.090 (.053)	1.00
Post-Communist	.089 (.004)	1.00	.050 (.020)	1.00	.116 (.004)	1.00	.074 (.023)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	-.015 (.012)	1.00	-.024 (.022)	1.00	.144 (.016)	1.00	-.012 (.019)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	.002 (.002)	1.00	.005 (.003)	1.00	-.004 (.014)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	.000 (.001)	1.00	.005 (.005)	1.00	.030 (.007)	1.00	.025 (.027)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	.000 (.001)	1.00	-.006 (.004)	1.00	-.031 (.007)	1.00	-.072 (.026)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.003 (.001)	1.00	.005 (.004)	1.00	.002 (.006)	1.00	.054 (.024)	1.00
Ideology \times Diversity	.003 (.001)	1.00	-.008 (.006)	1.00	-.063 (.008)	1.00	-.045 (.030)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.010 (.002)	1.00	.008 (.011)	1.00	-.069 (.017)	1.00	-.124 (.070)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.005 (.011)	1.01	.004 (.010)	1.01	.021 (.021)	1.00	.004 (.011)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.000 (.003)	1.00	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.003)	1.00	.000 (.005)	1.00
σ^2	.057 (.000)	1.00	.060 (.002)	1.00	.056 (.000)	1.00	.052 (.002)	1.00
N (Country)	25		25		32		32	
N (Year)	19		19		12		12	
Observations	184,133		7,673		152,717		8,234	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A2: Multilevel Linear Models from Figure 2 (WVS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>				
	Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.337 (.080)	1.01	.407 (.120)	1.00
Age	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female	.009 (.002)	1.00	.010 (.004)	1.00
Education	-.033 (.003)	1.00	-.037 (.007)	1.00
Income	-.148 (.004)	1.00	-.149 (.010)	1.00
Religiosity	-.009 (.003)	1.00	-.011 (.008)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.072 (.007)	1.00	.035 (.017)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	.154 (.033)	1.00	.070 (.051)	1.00
Post-Communist	.016 (.029)	1.00	.067 (.042)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.025 (.009)	1.01	.019 (.013)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	-.001 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	.009 (.005)	1.00	.011 (.011)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.001 (.009)	1.00	.008 (.020)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	-.047 (.012)	1.00	.002 (.029)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.053 (.009)	1.00	.013 (.020)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.160 (.019)	1.00	-.077 (.045)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.007 (.009)	1.01	.008 (.011)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.002 (.014)	1.00	.003 (.019)	1.00
σ^2	.058 (.001)	1.01	.057 (.001)	1.00
N (Country)	56		50	
N (Year)	8		8	
Observations	79,451		15,074	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A3: Model Output for Figure 3 — Austria

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.899*** (.048)	.881*** (.046)	.786*** (.048)	-	-	-	.842*** (.045)	.810*** (.044)	.855*** (.036)
Age	-.001* (.001)	-.000 (.001)	.001 (.001)	-	-	-	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Gender	.033* (.016)	.064*** (.016)	.043** (.016)	-	-	-	.028* (.013)	.039** (.013)	.029** (.011)
Education	-.106** (.036)	-.088* (.041)	-.104** (.039)	-	-	-	-.107** (.037)	-.044 (.040)	-.046 (.031)
Income	-.172*** (.046)	-.182*** (.046)	.011 (.041)	-	-	-	-.034 (.025)	-.019 (.026)	-.067*** (.020)
Religiosity	-.048 (.029)	-.011 (.030)	-.014 (.030)	-	-	-	-.057* (.024)	-.044 (.023)	-.061** (.019)
Ideology	-.198*** (.045)	-.223*** (.047)	-.350*** (.040)	-	-	-	-.165*** (.039)	-.168*** (.033)	-.195*** (.029)
Authoritarianism	.154* (.065)	.087 (.068)	.186** (.072)	-	-	-	.222*** (.066)	.057 (.060)	.131* (.051)
Observations	1,149	1,000	1,111	-	-	-	1,178	1,292	1,733
R^2	.056	.068	.084	-	-	-	.041	.032	.050
Adj. R^2	.050	.061	.078	-	-	-	.035	.027	.046

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A4: Model Output for Figure 3 — Belgium

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.790*** (.051)	.761*** (.051)	.888*** (.047)	.803*** (.048)	.742*** (.045)	.848*** (.044)	.836*** (.047)	.880*** (.042)	.863*** (.042)
Age	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.000 (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001** (.000)	.000 (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.000 (.000)
Gender	.032* (.015)	.060*** (.016)	.009 (.014)	.007 (.014)	.046*** (.014)	.012 (.013)	.033* (.014)	.029* (.013)	.036** (.013)
Education	-.096*** (.024)	-.078** (.025)	-.111*** (.022)	-.110*** (.022)	-.075* (.030)	-.118*** (.030)	-.070* (.032)	-.040 (.028)	-.025 (.027)
Income	-.130** (.048)	-.131** (.045)	-.174*** (.042)	-.048 (.029)	-.083** (.028)	-.122*** (.027)	-.085** (.029)	-.108*** (.027)	-.084*** (.025)
Religiosity	-.007 (.027)	-.049 (.027)	-.002 (.025)	-.005 (.024)	-.082*** (.024)	.017 (.022)	-.003 (.023)	-.010 (.021)	.007 (.021)
Ideology	-.175*** (.039)	-.146*** (.040)	-.204*** (.034)	-.150*** (.036)	-.192*** (.036)	-.218*** (.033)	-.210*** (.033)	-.246*** (.032)	-.244*** (.032)
Authoritarianism	.083 (.077)	.101 (.081)	.071 (.074)	.064 (.074)	.169* (.074)	.119 (.072)	-.063 (.076)	-.052 (.069)	-.035 (.071)
Observations	1,161	1,192	1,469	1,416	1,350	1,546	1,461	1,528	1,464
R^2	.066	.060	.081	.051	.076	.078	.060	.068	.064
Adj. R^2	.061	.054	.076	.046	.071	.074	.056	.064	.059

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A5: Model Output for Figure 3 — Denmark

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.717*** (.056)	.778*** (.052)	.768*** (.052)	.678*** (.048)	.736*** (.046)	.711*** (.045)	.745*** (.048)	- (.049)	.716*** (.049)
Age	-.001* (.001)	.001* (.001)	.001* (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.000 (.000)	.001* (.000)	.000 (.000)	- (.000)	.001 (.000)
Gender	.020 (.017)	.039* (.017)	.050** (.015)	.032* (.015)	.043** (.015)	.052*** (.015)	.030 (.016)	- (.016)	.040** (.015)
Education	-.043 (.030)	-.034 (.028)	-.048 (.025)	-.000 (.027)	-.076* (.033)	-.106** (.033)	-.003 (.037)	- (.037)	-.009 (.034)
Income	-.109* (.049)	-.154*** (.045)	-.086* (.041)	-.065* (.027)	-.077** (.025)	-.068** (.025)	-.122*** (.027)	- (.027)	-.140*** (.025)
Religiosity	.009 (.035)	.051 (.034)	-.046 (.030)	-.038 (.030)	-.005 (.030)	-.020 (.029)	.036 (.030)	- (.030)	.003 (.029)
Ideology	-.393*** (.043)	-.528*** (.043)	-.478*** (.036)	-.511*** (.035)	-.528*** (.035)	-.497*** (.032)	-.438*** (.034)	- (.034)	-.479*** (.033)
Authoritarianism	.282*** (.074)	.054 (.072)	.082 (.067)	.133 (.071)	.185** (.070)	.168* (.069)	.034 (.074)	- (.074)	.177* (.070)
Observations	1,112	1,094	1,196	1,259	1,228	1,275	1,199	-	1,206
R^2	.097	.157	.164	.170	.194	.198	.156	-	.199
Adj. R^2	.091	.151	.159	.166	.190	.194	.151	-	.194

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A6: Model Output for Figure 3 — Finland

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.860*** (.038)	.808*** (.040)	.729*** (.049)	.866*** (.033)	.804*** (.035)	.808*** (.032)	.872*** (.034)	.818*** (.032)	.838*** (.033)
Age	.001* (.000)	.001** (.000)	.002** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Gender	.060*** (.013)	.061*** (.013)	.019 (.016)	.034** (.011)	.013 (.012)	.049*** (.011)	.034** (.011)	.032** (.011)	.038*** (.011)
Education	-.085*** (.020)	-.096*** (.020)	-.061* (.024)	-.035 (.018)	-.061* (.026)	-.057* (.024)	-.120*** (.025)	-.053* (.024)	-.081** (.025)
Income	-.109** (.037)	-.151*** (.036)	-.024 (.046)	-.072*** (.020)	-.066** (.021)	-.040* (.019)	-.019 (.020)	-.074*** (.020)	-.091*** (.020)
Religiosity	.043 (.027)	.052* (.026)	-.006 (.031)	.054* (.023)	.062** (.023)	.042* (.021)	.022 (.021)	.057** (.021)	.033 (.021)
Ideology	-.317*** (.031)	-.330*** (.033)	-.288*** (.038)	-.429*** (.028)	-.399*** (.030)	-.342*** (.026)	-.412*** (.028)	-.371*** (.027)	-.384*** (.027)
Authoritarianism	.150* (.059)	.172** (.063)	.246** (.075)	.118* (.053)	.196*** (.059)	.055 (.050)	.147** (.052)	.122* (.050)	.146** (.050)
Observations	1,492	1,466	968	1,624	1,406	1,892	1,789	1,707	1,512
R^2	.134	.161	.123	.190	.181	.137	.156	.168	.211
Adj. R^2	.129	.157	.116	.187	.177	.134	.153	.164	.207

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A7: Model Output for Figure 3 — Germany

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.794*** (.038)	.794*** (.038)	.894*** (.037)	.847*** (.033)	.824*** (.035)	.826*** (.030)	.835*** (.030)	.829*** (.030)	.861*** (.034)
Age	-.000 (.000)	.001** (.000)	.001* (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.000 (.000)	.001** (.000)
Gender	.040*** (.012)	.005 (.012)	.020 (.012)	.006 (.011)	.020 (.011)	.010 (.010)	.020* (.010)	.009 (.010)	.034** (.011)
Education	-.091*** (.024)	-.145*** (.024)	-.101*** (.024)	-.072** (.022)	-.131*** (.030)	-.037 (.025)	-.094*** (.024)	-.003 (.025)	-.079** (.028)
Income	-.201*** (.034)	-.206*** (.032)	-.309*** (.033)	-.193*** (.021)	-.150*** (.020)	-.147*** (.017)	-.097*** (.017)	-.136*** (.018)	-.078*** (.020)
Religiosity	-.099*** (.021)	-.118*** (.021)	-.122*** (.020)	-.066*** (.019)	-.082*** (.019)	-.077*** (.017)	-.066*** (.017)	-.075*** (.017)	-.091*** (.019)
Ideology	-.200*** (.033)	-.187*** (.033)	-.174*** (.032)	-.263*** (.031)	-.221*** (.031)	-.196*** (.026)	-.263*** (.026)	-.225*** (.028)	-.185*** (.030)
Authoritarianism	.191*** (.055)	.189*** (.056)	.097 (.052)	.206*** (.051)	.197*** (.054)	.118* (.047)	.123** (.046)	.141** (.047)	-.010 (.053)
Observations	2,010	1,885	1,854	1,998	2,104	2,287	2,443	2,289	1,828
R^2	.083	.105	.122	.125	.108	.099	.093	.078	.065
Adj. R^2	.080	.102	.119	.122	.105	.096	.090	.075	.062

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A8: Model Output for Figure 3 — Hungary

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	-	-	.801*** (.051)	.872*** (.051)	.836*** (.049)	.836*** (.048)	.838*** (.048)	-	-
Age	-	-	.001** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	-	-
Gender	-	-	.044* (.019)	.043* (.019)	.053** (.017)	.048** (.017)	.051** (.017)	-	-
Education	-	-	-.084* (.034)	-.108*** (.035)	-.071* (.031)	-.078** (.031)	-.063* (.031)	-	-
Income	-	-	-.115*** (.026)	-.092*** (.025)	-.088*** (.022)	-.086*** (.022)	-.088*** (.021)	-	-
Religiosity	-	-	-.047 (.031)	-.013 (.030)	-.028 (.027)	-.027 (.026)	-.028 (.027)	-	-
Ideology	-	-	-.279*** (.040)	-.279*** (.041)	-.290*** (.038)	-.282*** (.038)	-.268*** (.037)	-	-
Authoritarianism	-	-	.112 (.072)	.063 (.073)	.086 (.067)	.100* (.066)	.118* (.065)	-	-
Observations	-	-	1,182	1,281	1,255	1,269	1,318	-	-
R^2	-	-	.117	.106	.114	.117	.116	-	-
Adj. R^2	-	-	.111	.100	.109	.112	.111	-	-

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A9: Model Output for Figure 3 — Netherlands

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.822*** (.042)	.768*** (.043)	.807*** (.040)	.802*** (.038)	.751*** (.038)	.847*** (.037)	.805*** (.038)	.848*** (.036)	.806*** (.036)
Age	.001** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Gender	.026 (.015)	.018 (.015)	.043* (.014)	.025 (.013)	.032* (.014)	.044** (.013)	.036* (.014)	.042** (.013)	.040** (.013)
Education	-.088*** (.025)	-.069** (.025)	-.086*** (.022)	-.067** (.023)	-.081** (.029)	-.084*** (.029)	-.054* (.030)	-.081*** (.027)	-.064** (.027)
Income	-.131*** (.033)	-.117*** (.031)	-.132*** (.030)	-.108*** (.021)	-.088*** (.022)	-.107*** (.020)	-.104*** (.021)	-.103*** (.021)	-.093*** (.020)
Religiosity	-.054* (.027)	-.079** (.027)	-.082** (.025)	-.083*** (.024)	-.059** (.024)	-.044 (.023)	-.052* (.023)	-.062** (.022)	-.068** (.022)
Ideology	-.221*** (.033)	-.214*** (.033)	-.222*** (.030)	-.241*** (.031)	-.228*** (.032)	-.239*** (.028)	-.225*** (.029)	-.243*** (.028)	-.231*** (.028)
Authoritarianism	.110 (.064)	.115 (.064)	.092 (.059)	.149** (.061)	.144** (.061)	.087 (.059)	.122* (.060)	.119* (.057)	.103 (.058)
Observations	1,556	1,545	1,727	1,714	1,541	1,595	1,586	1,596	1,587
R^2	.105	.099	.106	.131	.113	.121	.112	.130	.117
Adj. R^2	.100	.094	.102	.127	.109	.118	.108	.126	.113

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A10: Model Output for Figure 3 — Norway

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.746*** (.038)	.849*** (.044)	.856*** (.043)	.771*** (.043)	.798*** (.039)	.750*** (.039)	.684*** (.041)	.834*** (.040)	.839*** (.039)
Age	.001* (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Gender	.030** (.011)	.026* (.013)	.050*** (.013)	.036** (.014)	.045*** (.013)	.035** (.012)	.007 (.013)	.011 (.013)	.058*** (.013)
Education	-.081*** (.022)	-.071** (.022)	-.086*** (.022)	-.094*** (.024)	-.137*** (.029)	-.104*** (.028)	-.033 (.030)	-.051 (.029)	-.034 (.029)
Income	-.041 (.029)	-.079* (.033)	-.127*** (.032)	-.071** (.026)	-.098*** (.023)	-.085*** (.021)	-.069** (.022)	-.063** (.022)	-.034 (.022)
Religiosity	-.008 (.022)	.038 (.025)	-.051* (.025)	-.043 (.026)	-.006 (.025)	-.007 (.023)	.033 (.026)	-.033 (.025)	-.019 (.024)
Ideology	-.333*** (.027)	-.410*** (.031)	-.412*** (.031)	-.375*** (.032)	-.395*** (.031)	-.340*** (.029)	-.426*** (.031)	-.422*** (.029)	-.437*** (.026)
Authoritarianism	.243*** (.051)	.152* (.062)	.219*** (.057)	.241*** (.063)	.124* (.060)	.131* (.058)	.236*** (.063)	.133* (.061)	.028 (.057)
Observations	1654	1412	1373	1223	1367	1430	1257	1325	1125
R^2	.141	.161	.177	.163	.172	.147	.188	.162	.244
Adj. R^2	.138	.157	.172	.158	.168	.143	.183	.157	.240

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A11: Model Output for Figure 3 — Sweden

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.795*** (.036)	.838*** (.038)	.858*** (.038)	.826*** (.037)	.833*** (.036)	.763*** (.033)	.842*** (.032)	.779*** (.037)	.831*** (.038)
Age	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)
Gender	.070*** (.011)	.052*** (.012)	.094*** (.012)	.053*** (.011)	.037** (.012)	.065*** (.011)	.028** (.011)	.047*** (.012)	.020 (.011)
Education	-.064*** (.019)	-.060** (.019)	-.109*** (.019)	-.068*** (.019)	-.090** (.028)	-.040 (.024)	-.042 (.025)	-.005 (.027)	-.014 (.026)
Income	-.109** (.035)	-.158*** (.035)	-.101** (.034)	-.052* (.023)	-.061** (.020)	-.063*** (.018)	-.027 (.018)	-.076*** (.020)	-.032 (.023)
Religiosity	-.004 (.021)	.023 (.022)	-.007 (.022)	-.000 (.021)	.021 (.023)	.019 (.019)	.042* (.020)	.004 (.022)	-.039 (.022)
Ideology	-.319*** (.024)	-.330*** (.026)	-.326*** (.025)	-.422*** (.025)	-.378*** (.027)	-.348*** (.024)	-.409*** (.022)	-.352*** (.026)	-.438*** (.025)
Authoritarianism	.168** (.054)	.166** (.057)	.159** (.056)	.121* (.057)	.065 (.059)	.090 (.051)	.056 (.049)	.055 (.057)	.043 (.055)
Observations	1442	1433	1361	1361	1226	1517	1464	1265	1268
R^2	.194	.167	.211	.226	.201	.198	.217	.183	.225
Adj. R^2	.190	.163	.207	.222	.196	.195	.214	.179	.220

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A12: Model Output for Figure 3 — Switzerland

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019
(Intercept)	.969*** (.051)	.977*** (.050)	1.032*** (.055)	.954*** (.042)	.952*** (.050)	.939*** (.052)	.920*** (.051)	.970*** (.049)	.977*** (.051)
Age	-.000 (.000)	-.001** (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.001* (.000)	-.001* (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.001 (.000)
Gender	.010 (.014)	.025 (.014)	.030* (.015)	-.002 (.015)	.039* (.015)	.033* (.015)	.011 (.016)	.025 (.015)	.032 (.016)
Education	-.179*** (.026)	-.076** (.026)	-.188*** (.028)	-.104*** (.027)	-.100** (.037)	-.106** (.039)	-.147*** (.039)	-.121** (.037)	-.141*** (.040)
Income	-.142*** (.042)	-.228*** (.041)	-.186*** (.044)	-.207*** (.026)	-.218*** (.029)	-.119*** (.029)	-.182*** (.030)	-.157*** (.029)	-.135*** (.029)
Religiosity	.063* (.026)	.035 (.025)	.029 (.027)	-.032 (.025)	.055* (.028)	.040 (.027)	.075** (.028)	.026 (.027)	-.005 (.027)
Ideology	-.326*** (.037)	-.419*** (.036)	-.373*** (.040)	-.276*** (.039)	-.318*** (.039)	-.368*** (.040)	-.388*** (.042)	-.377*** (.036)	-.458*** (.040)
Authoritarianism	.005 (.068)	.229*** (.067)	.099 (.075)	.156* (.066)	.130 (.079)	.068 (.080)	.041 (.084)	-.050 (.076)	.132 (.083)
Observations	1367	1392	1267	1169	1069	1042	1086	1085	997
R^2	.113	.141	.136	.139	.148	.113	.152	.157	.182
Adj. R^2	.109	.137	.131	.134	.143	.107	.147	.151	.177

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

B Alternative Model Specifications

Table B1: Multilevel Linear Models with GDP Interactions (ESS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	Non-EU Immigration				Δ Fractionalization			
	Majorities		Minorities		Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	-.118 (.144)	1.01	-.413 (.479)	1.00	-1.456 (.163)	1.01	.166 (.278)	1.00
Age	-.006 (.001)	1.00	-.011 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.001)	1.00	.000 (.002)	1.00
Female	-.150 (.024)	1.00	-.165 (.125)	1.00	-.129 (.018)	1.00	-.177 (.067)	1.00
Education	-.087 (.053)	1.00	.135 (.265)	1.00	.108 (.034)	1.00	.088 (.125)	1.00
Income	-.003 (.045)	1.00	.481 (.238)	1.00	.049 (.034)	1.00	.049 (.126)	1.00
Religiosity	-.148 (.044)	1.00	.401 (.217)	1.00	-.053 (.034)	1.00	.034 (.122)	1.00
Ideology	2.040 (.059)	1.00	1.829 (.303)	1.00	1.159 (.038)	1.00	.694 (.143)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.732 (.120)	1.00	.955 (.617)	1.00	.569 (.086)	1.00	.646 (.292)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	-.002 (.002)	1.00	-.015 (.009)	1.00	-.023 (.015)	1.00	.067 (.054)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.087 (.014)	1.01	.117 (.046)	1.00	.221 (.016)	1.00	.052 (.027)	1.00
Post-Communist	.088 (.004)	1.00	.050 (.020)	1.00	.112 (.004)	1.00	.072 (.024)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Age \times GDP	.001 (.000)	1.00	.001 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	-.001 (.001)	1.00	.000 (.003)	1.00	-.003 (.004)	1.00	-.017 (.014)	1.00
Female \times GDP	.017 (.002)	1.00	.017 (.012)	1.00	.015 (.002)	1.00	.020 (.007)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.001 (.001)	1.00	.005 (.005)	1.00	.038 (.007)	1.00	.030 (.028)	1.00
Education \times GDP	.002 (.005)	1.00	-.019 (.026)	1.00	-.018 (.003)	1.00	-.013 (.012)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	.001 (.001)	1.00	.001 (.005)	1.00	-.021 (.007)	1.00	-.060 (.027)	1.00
Income \times GDP	-.009 (.004)	1.00	-.053 (.023)	1.00	-.013 (.003)	1.00	-.012 (.013)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.005 (.001)	1.00	.009 (.005)	1.00	-.004 (.006)	1.00	.055 (.026)	1.00
Religiosity \times GDP	.016 (.004)	1.00	-.041 (.021)	1.00	.006 (.003)	1.00	-.004 (.012)	1.00
Ideology \times Diversity	.024 (.001)	1.00	.016 (.007)	1.00	.015 (.008)	1.00	-.007 (.031)	1.00
Ideology \times GDP	-.229 (.006)	1.00	-.201 (.030)	1.00	-.135 (.004)	1.00	-.082 (.014)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.007 (.002)	1.00	.013 (.013)	1.00	-.049 (.018)	1.00	-.106 (.072)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times GDP	-.054 (.012)	1.00	-.084 (.061)	1.00	-.038 (.009)	1.00	-.043 (.030)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.005 (.011)	1.01	.004 (.011)	1.00	.018 (.020)	1.01	.004 (.011)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.000 (.003)	1.00	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.003)	1.00	.000 (.005)	1.00
σ^2	.056 (.000)	1.01	.059 (.002)	1.00	.056 (.000)	1.00	.052 (.002)	1.00
N (Country)	25		25		32		32	
N (Year)	19		19		12		12	
Observations	184,133		7,673		152,717		8,234	

Note: Entries are the medians of the posterior distributions of the model coefficients with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1 except for age, diversity salience, and GDP, which are in their natural metrics. Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B2: Multilevel Linear Models with GDP Interactions (WVS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>				
	Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.181 (.092)	1.00	.504 (.168)	1.00
Age	.003 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.001)	1.00
Female	-.020 (.014)	1.00	.029 (.033)	1.00
Education	-.097 (.022)	1.00	-.219 (.059)	1.00
Income	-.017 (.034)	1.00	.213 (.087)	1.00
Religiosity	.026 (.031)	1.00	.029 (.076)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.086 (.058)	1.00	-.309 (.150)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	.127 (.032)	1.00	.087 (.057)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.042 (.010)	1.00	.008 (.019)	1.00
Post-Communist	.016 (.028)	1.00	.070 (.042)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	-.001 (.000)	1.00
Age \times GDP	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	.004 (.005)	1.00	.014 (.013)	1.00
Female \times GDP	.003 (.002)	1.00	-.002 (.004)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.011 (.009)	1.00	-.027 (.023)	1.00
Education \times GDP	.007 (.003)	1.00	.021 (.007)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	-.022 (.013)	1.00	.070 (.035)	1.00
Income \times GDP	-.015 (.004)	1.00	-.042 (.010)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.047 (.010)	1.00	.016 (.023)	1.00
Religiosity \times GDP	-.004 (.003)	1.00	-.005 (.008)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.156 (.021)	1.00	-.132 (.051)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times GDP	-.001 (.006)	1.00	.039 (.017)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.006 (.008)	1.01	.008 (.011)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.002 (.013)	1.00	.003 (.019)	1.00
σ^2	.058 (.001)	1.00	.056 (.001)	1.00
N (Country)	56		50	
N (Year)	8		8	
Observations	79,451		15,074	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B3: Multilevel Linear Models without Post-Communist Countries (ESS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	Non-EU Immigration				Δ Fractionalization			
	Majorities		Minorities		Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.947 (.155)	1.00	.850 (.408)	1.00	-2.320 (.287)	1.00	1.075 (.545)	1.01
Age	.001 (.000)	1.00	.002 (.001)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female	.035 (.003)	1.00	.030 (.017)	1.00	.036 (.002)	1.00	.033 (.012)	1.00
Education	-.056 (.005)	1.00	-.049 (.032)	1.00	-.073 (.004)	1.00	-.043 (.020)	1.00
Income	-.102 (.006)	1.00	-.099 (.030)	1.00	-.077 (.005)	1.00	-.067 (.023)	1.00
Religiosity	.016 (.005)	1.00	-.018 (.028)	1.00	.006 (.004)	1.00	.005 (.021)	1.00
Ideology	-.411 (.007)	1.00	-.303 (.042)	1.00	-.225 (.005)	1.00	-.160 (.026)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.137 (.014)	1.00	.032 (.081)	1.00	.116 (.012)	1.00	.169 (.056)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	-.003 (.002)	1.00	-.010 (.010)	1.00	.012 (.019)	1.00	.057 (.087)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	-.010 (.014)	1.00	-.002 (.038)	1.00	.299 (.027)	1.00	-.033 (.051)	1.01
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	-.001 (.001)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	-.001 (.001)	1.00	-.002 (.003)	1.00	-.014 (.005)	1.00	-.013 (.022)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.002 (.001)	1.00	.002 (.006)	1.00	.023 (.009)	1.00	.029 (.040)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	.002 (.001)	1.00	.002 (.006)	1.00	-.050 (.010)	1.00	-.063 (.043)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.003 (.001)	1.00	.005 (.005)	1.00	.006 (.009)	1.00	.054 (.042)	1.00
Ideology \times Diversity	.022 (.001)	1.00	.009 (.008)	1.00	-.088 (.012)	1.00	-.011 (.050)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.006 (.003)	1.00	.015 (.015)	1.00	.032 (.026)	1.00	-.096 (.118)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.004 (.013)	1.01	.003 (.014)	1.00	.054 (.043)	1.00	.005 (.022)	1.01
τ_{00} (Year)	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.003)	1.01	.000 (.006)	1.00
σ^2	.057 (.000)	1.00	.063 (.002)	1.00	.058 (.001)	1.00	.057 (.002)	1.00
N (Country)	17		17		18		18	
N (Year)	19		19		12		12	
Observations	144,998		5,927		105,530		4,903	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except for age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B4: Multilevel Linear Models without Post-Communist Countries (WVS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>				
	Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.067 (.142)	1.01	.348 (.134)	1.00
Age	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female	.009 (.002)	1.00	.009 (.004)	1.00
Education	-.032 (.003)	1.00	-.042 (.007)	1.00
Income	-.139 (.005)	1.00	-.139 (.011)	1.00
Religiosity	-.004 (.004)	1.00	-.007 (.009)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.059 (.008)	1.00	.028 (.018)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	.061 (.041)	1.00	.008 (.066)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.057 (.016)	1.01	.026 (.015)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	-.001 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	.008 (.006)	1.00	-.005 (.014)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	.011 (.011)	1.00	.060 (.026)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	-.071 (.015)	1.01	-.064 (.035)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.070 (.011)	1.00	-.011 (.027)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.131 (.024)	1.00	-.042 (.064)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.008 (.016)	1.01	.009 (.012)	1.01
τ_{00} (Year)	.001 (.011)	1.00	.003 (.021)	1.00
σ^2	.057 (.001)	1.00	.056 (.001)	1.00
N (Country)	45		41	
N (Year)	7		7	
Observations	64,306		13,309	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except for age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B5: Multilevel Linear Models with GDP Interactions and without Post-Communist Countries (ESS)

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	Non-EU Immigration				Δ Fractionalization			
	Majorities		Minorities		Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	.137 (.215)	1.00	-.554 (.830)	1.00	-3.448 (.299)	1.00	.203 (.743)	1.00
Age	-.003 (.001)	1.00	-.012 (.008)	1.00	-.004 (.001)	1.00	-.017 (.006)	1.00
Female	-.058 (.044)	1.00	.221 (.212)	1.00	-.143 (.038)	1.00	-.115 (.160)	1.00
Education	.388 (.085)	1.00	.962 (.407)	1.00	.597 (.069)	1.00	.513 (.292)	1.00
Income	.135 (.086)	1.00	.457 (.416)	1.00	.435 (.080)	1.00	.572 (.360)	1.00
Religiosity	-.417 (.079)	1.00	.959 (.389)	1.00	-.225 (.079)	1.00	.545 (.309)	1.00
Ideology	2.111 (.098)	1.00	1.661 (.536)	1.00	2.515 (.082)	1.00	1.347 (.319)	1.00
Authoritarianism	-.502 (.208)	1.00	-.694 (1.179)	1.00	-.466 (.190)	1.00	-1.341 (.830)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	-.005 (.002)	1.00	-.014 (.010)	1.00	.054 (.019)	1.00	.082 (.087)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.067 (.020)	1.00	.130 (.077)	1.00	.404 (.028)	1.00	-.045 (.069)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.01	.000 (.001)	1.00
Age \times GDP	.000 (.000)	1.00	.001 (.001)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00	.002 (.001)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	-.001 (.001)	1.00	-.001 (.003)	1.00	-.011 (.005)	1.00	-.009 (.024)	1.00
Female \times GDP	.009 (.004)	1.00	-.018 (.020)	1.00	.017 (.004)	1.00	.014 (.015)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.001 (.001)	1.00	.005 (.006)	1.00	.002 (.009)	1.00	.010 (.042)	1.00
Education \times GDP	-.042 (.008)	1.00	-.095 (.038)	1.00	-.063 (.006)	1.00	-.052 (.027)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	.002 (.001)	1.00	.002 (.006)	1.00	-.050 (.010)	1.00	-.062 (.045)	1.00
Income \times GDP	-.022 (.008)	1.00	-.052 (.039)	1.00	-.048 (.007)	1.00	-.060 (.034)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.005 (.001)	1.00	.007 (.006)	1.00	.006 (.009)	1.00	.043 (.042)	1.00
Religiosity \times GDP	.041 (.007)	1.00	-.091 (.036)	1.00	.022 (.007)	1.00	-.050 (.028)	1.00
Ideology \times Diversity	.027 (.001)	1.00	.014 (.008)	1.00	-.179 (.012)	1.00	-.088 (.052)	1.00
Ideology \times GDP	-.237 (.009)	1.00	-.185 (.051)	1.00	-.256 (.008)	1.00	-.141 (.030)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.006 (.003)	1.00	.014 (.014)	1.00	.039 (.027)	1.00	-.073 (.123)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times GDP	.059 (.020)	1.00	.068 (.109)	1.00	.055 (.018)	1.00	.141 (.078)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.004 (.013)	1.00	.004 (.015)	1.00	.052 (.045)	1.00	.005 (.020)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.003)	1.00	.000 (.006)	1.00
σ^2	.057 (.000)	1.00	.063 (.002)	1.00	.057 (.001)	1.00	.056 (.002)	1.00
N (Country)	17		17		18		18	
N (Year)	19		19		12		12	
Observations	144,998		5,927		105,530		4,903	

Note: Entries are medians of posterior distributions with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled 0–1 except for age, diversity salience, and GDP (log). Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B6: Multilevel Linear Models with GDP Interactions and without Post-Communist Countries (WVS)

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>			
	Majorities		Minorities	
	Est.	Rhat	Est.	Rhat
(Intercept)	-.052 (.148)	1.02	.369 (.183)	1.00
Age	.002 (.001)	1.00	.000 (.001)	1.00
Female	-.023 (.014)	1.00	.020 (.037)	1.01
Education	-.111 (.024)	1.00	-.197 (.064)	1.00
Income	-.019 (.035)	1.00	.110 (.099)	1.00
Religiosity	.049 (.033)	1.00	-.006 (.093)	1.00
Authoritarianism	.047 (.063)	1.00	-.120 (.168)	1.00
Ethnic Diversity Salience	.035 (.038)	1.00	.019 (.075)	1.00
GDP per capita (log)	.069 (.016)	1.02	.024 (.020)	1.00
Age \times Diversity	.000 (.000)	1.00	-.001 (.001)	1.00
Age \times GDP	.000 (.000)	1.00	.000 (.000)	1.00
Female \times Diversity	.001 (.007)	1.00	-.002 (.017)	1.00
Female \times GDP	.004 (.002)	1.00	-.001 (.004)	1.00
Education \times Diversity	-.005 (.012)	1.00	.018 (.030)	1.00
Education \times GDP	.009 (.003)	1.00	.018 (.007)	1.00
Income \times Diversity	-.044 (.016)	1.00	.006 (.046)	1.00
Income \times GDP	-.014 (.004)	1.00	-.029 (.011)	1.00
Religiosity \times Diversity	-.060 (.012)	1.00	-.012 (.034)	1.00
Religiosity \times GDP	-.006 (.004)	1.00	.000 (.010)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times Diversity	-.133 (.027)	1.00	-.084 (.071)	1.00
Authoritarianism \times GDP	.002 (.007)	1.00	.017 (.019)	1.00
τ_{00} (Country)	.008 (.015)	1.03	.008 (.012)	1.00
τ_{00} (Year)	.001 (.011)	1.01	.003 (.020)	1.00
σ^2	.056 (.001)	1.00	.056 (.002)	1.01
N (Country)	45		41	
N (Year)	7		7	
Observations	64,306		13,309	

Note: Entries are the medians of the posterior distributions of the model coefficients with median absolute deviations in parentheses. All variables are scaled from 0 to 1 except for age, diversity salience, and GDP, which are in their natural metrics. Rhat = 1 indicates convergence.

Table B7: LISS Experiment Broken out by Migrant Condition

	DV: Reward (v. Betray)	
Age	0.007* (0.003)	0.015* (0.007)
Female	0.122 (0.102)	0.265 (0.257)
Education	0.135 (0.175)	0.326 (0.432)
Income	-0.364 (0.362)	-0.957 (0.901)
Religiosity	-0.139 (0.134)	-0.536 (0.345)
Ideology	0.064 (0.250)	-0.547 (0.751)
Authoritarianism	3.250 (1.668)	4.031* (1.796)
Condition: Canadian Migrant	0.976 (1.264)	1.507 (1.495)
Condition: Colombian Migrant	1.788 (1.185)	2.057 (1.465)
Condition: Libyan Migrant	1.191 (1.158)	1.257 (1.412)
Condition: Pakistani Migrant	2.663* (1.136)	3.911** (1.403)
Age \times Canadian Migrant		-0.011 (0.011)
Age \times Colombian Migrant		-0.011 (0.010)
Age \times Libyan Migrant		-0.009 (0.010)
Age \times Pakistani Migrant		-0.007 (0.010)
Female \times Canadian Migrant		-0.166 (0.340)
Female \times Colombian Migrant		-0.472 (0.352)
Female \times Libyan Migrant		0.150 (0.343)
Female \times Pakistani Migrant		-0.186 (0.346)
Education \times Canadian Migrant		0.016 (0.569)
Education \times Colombian Migrant		-0.036 (0.574)
Education \times Libyan Migrant		-0.382 (0.609)
Education \times Pakistani Migrant		-0.651 (0.608)
Income \times Canadian Migrant		0.372 (1.231)
Income \times Colombian Migrant		1.035 (1.191)
Income \times Libyan Migrant		1.152 (1.185)
Income \times Pakistani Migrant		-0.365 (1.288)
Religiosity \times Canadian Migrant		0.123 (0.464)
Religiosity \times Colombian Migrant		1.231** (0.459)
Religiosity \times Libyan Migrant		0.210 (0.460)
Religiosity \times Pakistani Migrant		0.182 (0.447)
Ideology \times Canadian Migrant		0.271 (0.927)
Ideology \times Colombian Migrant		0.558 (0.926)
Ideology \times Libyan Migrant		1.584 (0.925)
Ideology \times Pakistani Migrant		0.536 (0.942)
Authoritarianism \times Canadian Migrant	-2.254 (2.433)	-2.662 (2.588)
Authoritarianism \times Colombian Migrant	-3.335 (2.289)	-4.522 (2.475)
Authoritarianism \times Libyan Migrant	-2.532 (2.257)	-4.009 (2.520)
Authoritarianism \times Pakistani Migrant	-5.214* (2.210)	-6.654** (2.391)
(Intercept)	-1.985* (0.876)	-2.311* (0.994)
N	761	761
Log Likelihood	-518.851	-505.481

Note: Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table B8: LISS Experiment Including Late Completers

	DV: Reward (v. Betray)	
Age	0.007* (0.003)	0.015* (0.007)
Female	0.118 (0.101)	0.265 (0.257)
Education	0.109 (0.172)	0.326 (0.432)
Income	-0.333 (0.358)	-0.957 (0.901)
Religiosity	-0.139 (0.133)	-0.536 (0.345)
Ideology	0.031 (0.246)	-0.547 (0.751)
Authoritarianism	3.242 (1.667)	4.031* (1.796)
Condition: Non-Western Migrant	1.867 (0.962)	2.339* (1.144)
Condition: Western Migrant	0.846 (1.259)	1.340 (1.486)
Age \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.010 (0.008)
Age \times Western Migrant		-0.009 (0.010)
Female \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.163 (0.288)
Female \times Western Migrant		-0.134 (0.336)
Education \times Non-Western Migrant		-0.393 (0.487)
Education \times Western Migrant		0.002 (0.567)
Income \times Non-Western Migrant		0.823 (1.008)
Income \times Western Migrant		0.392 (1.214)
Religiosity \times Non-Western Migrant		0.548 (0.382)
Religiosity \times Western Migrant		0.121 (0.458)
Ideology \times Non-Western Migrant		0.836 (0.811)
Ideology \times Western Migrant		0.109 (0.913)
Authoritarianism \times Non-Western Migrant	-3.670* (1.870)	-4.893* (2.026)
Authoritarianism \times Western Migrant	-2.020 (2.424)	-2.364 (2.582)
(Intercept)	-1.974* (0.875)	-2.311* (0.994)
N	771	771
Log Likelihood	-527.105	-522.694

Note: Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

C Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey

Country	Coded as Majority	Coded as Minority
Armenia	Armenian	Greek / Jew / Kurd/Esid / Russian / Yazidis / Other
Australia	Australian (English speaking) / European / White	South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc) / East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc) / Arabic, Central Asian / Thai, Vietnamese, Malaysian, etc / Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander / Other
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijani / Caucasian white	Avarian / Chekh / Iranian / Jew / Lezgin / Moldovan / Russian / Spanish / Tatarian / Turkmenian
Belarus	Belorussian	Polish / Russian / Ukrainian / Other
Brazil	Half breed of black and white / Caucasian (White) / Brown - Moreno ou pardo / Half breed of white and indian	Negro (Black) / Chines, Japanese,... / Indigenous / South Asian / Arabic / Other
Bulgaria	Bulgarian / Caucasian white	Gypsy / Turkish / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc / Arabic, Central Asian / Other
Burkina Faso	Negro Black	Caucasian white / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc / Arabic, Central Asian / Other
Canada	Caucasian (White) / European - English	Black (African, African-American, etc.) / West Asian (Iranian, Afghan, etc.) / Southeast Asian (Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, etc.) / Arabic (Central Asia) / South Asian (Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.) / Latin American / Hispanic / Aboriginal / First Nations / Chinese / Filipino / Korean / Japanese / French / German / Italian / Polish / East Asian Chinese, Japanese / Other
Chile	White, Caucasian / Mestizo(a)	Black / South Asian (hindu, pakistani, brown) / East Asian (chinese, japanese, korean,...) / Arab (light brown) / Indigenous / Asiatic / Indian / Mulatto(a) / Other
China	Chinese / Han nationality / East Asian Chinese	Zhuang nationality / Hui nationality / Uygur nationality / Miao nationality / Manchu nationality / Other
Colombia	Among all I am mulato / Among all, I am Latine / Among all, I am crossbreed / Among all, I am white / Among all I am Colombian / White	Among all, I am black / Among all, I am indigenous / Afro-colombian / Gypsie / Indigenous / Other
Cyprus	Caucasian white	Negro Black / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc. / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Other
Ecuador	Above all, I am a mulatto / Above all, I am Latino / Above all, I am mestizo / Mostly i'm white / I consider myself Ecuadorian above all / Blanco / Mestizo / Moreno oscuro / Moreno claro	Mostly i'm black / Above all, I am indigenous / Negro / Indigena / Montubio / Mulato / Other
Estonia	Causasian white	
Ethiopia	Amhara / Oromo	Tigre / Somali / Afar / Sidama / Wolayta / Shankella / Gurage / Gamo / Other Africans/Negro Black / Other

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	Coded as Majority	Coded as Minority
Finland	Caucasian white	Negro Black / Arabic, Central Asian / Otjer
Germany	German / Caucasian White	Southern European / Turkish / Yugoslavian / African / Asiatic / Other
Ghana	Akan	Frafra / Krobo / Ningo / Shai / Ada / Kotokoli / Bono / Komkomba / Nzema / Busanga / Mamprugu / Gonja / Mampuli / Dagari / Bimba / Dagomba / Ijaw / Esako / Ga Afangbe / Dagbani / Hausa / Guan / Ewe / French / Ga-Dangme / Other africans / Other
Hungary	Hungarian	Gypsy
Indonesia	Javanese / Sundanese	Malay / Chinese / Arab / Sumatranese / Aceh / Batak / Banjar / Betawi / Bengkulu / Bugis / Dani / Dayak / Flores / Lani / Lampung / Maduranese / Makassar / Mandar / Manggarai / Melayu / Minangkabau / Palembang / Pattae / Toraja / Kalimantan / Sulawesi / Lombok/Sumbawa / Asian - East (Chinese, Japanese) / Asian - Central (Arabic) / Other
Iran	Persian	Turk/Azeri / Kurd / Lor / Gilak/Mazani/Shomali / Baluch / Arab / Armenian / Turkman / Other
Iraq	Arab	Kurdish / Turk / Ashur / Keldan / Other
Japan	East Asian Chinese,Japanese	Caucasian (White) / Negro (Black) / South Asian (Indian) / Arabic (Central Asia) / Other
Kazakhstan	Kazakh	Korean / Uigur / Bashkir / Lezgin / Belorus / Azeri / Iranian and Central Asian / Georgian / German / Kurdish / Kyrgyz / Moldovan / Russian / Tajik / Tatar / Ukrainian / Uzbek / Udmurt / Mordvin / Polander / Bulgarian / Azerbaijanian / Chechen / Turkish / Dungan / Armenian / Chinese
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz	Kirguis / European / Tayiko / Ruso / Kazakh / Asian / Uzbek / Tatar / Turkish / German / Ukrainian / Dukan / Kalmyk / Uigur / Azerbaijanian / Kurd / Korenian / Other
Lebanon	Lebanese/Arabic	Others
Malaysia	Malay	Bugis / Jawa / Brunei Malay / Kadazan / Bajau / Murut / Iban / Bidayuh / Melanau / Kelabit / Chinese / Rungus / Indian / Others Bumi
Mali	Black	White / Asian South / Arab / Other
Mexico	Coloured (medium) / White / Light brown / Dark brown	Black / Indigenous / South Asian (Indian, Pakistani) / East Asian (Chinese, Japanese) / Arabic (Central Asia) / Undocumented 1 / Undocumented 2 / Indian (American) / Other
Moldova	Moldovian	Russian / Ukrainian / Gagaus / Bulgarian / Other
Morocco	Arabe / White	Asie de l'est / Berbere / Black / Yellow/Asian
Netherlands	Caucasian white	Negro Black / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc. / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Asian / Other
New Zealand	Pakeha / European / New Zealander first, ethnic group second	Maori / Pacific Islander / Asian

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	Coded as Majority	Coded as Minority
Nigeria	Yoruba / Hausa / Igbo	Fulani / Tiv / Ibibio / Frafra / Krobo / Loss / Bono / Gonja / Mampuli / Dagari / Bimba / Dagomba / Yala / Bassa / Gbagi / Ciawa / Ijaw / Esan / Edo / Esako / Urhobo / Nupe / Chamba / Kilba / Higgi / Bachama / Yungur / Tangale / Bukwarra / Ikom / Ogoja / Boki / Efik / Ejagam / Baribari / Caucasian white / Negro Black / South Asian Indian P / East Asian Chinese J / Other Africans / Others
Pakistan	Punjabi / Pakistani	Pathan / Baluchi / Sindhi / Urdu speaking / Pashto / Hindko / Seraiki / Hindko / Others
Peru	White / Half-breed Andino / Half-breed Amazonas / Indigenous half-breed / European half-breed	Black or crossbreed / Asiatic or crossbreed / Indian / Arab / Indigenous / Native / Afro half-breed / Asian half-breed / Quechua / Aymara / Amazonian / Migrant of other origin / Other
Philippines	Tagalog / Bisaya	Ilonggo / Bicolano / Ilocano / Waray / Chabacano / Kapampangan / Kaulo / Bagobo / Chinese / Aklanon / Sama / Matanao / Bilaan / Spanish / Cebuano / Zambal / Antiqueno / Masbateno / Pangasinense / Kankana-ay / Ibaloy/Ibanag / Tausog / Suriganon / Muslim / Bagubu / Litinya/Leyteyo / Davaoeno/Dabawenyo / Maranao/Matanao / Maguindanao / Bungolanon / Kanglo / Manobo / Kulanan / Kalagan / Minority / Lubano / Igorot / Yakan / Marinduque / Ayangan (Kankanaey) / Tinguian Tribe / Belwang tribe / Matinguian Tribe / Sambal / Mangyan / Romblomanon / Subanin / Cantilangnon / Kamayo / Boholano / Taga Kaulo / Sinamah / Other Southeast Asian
Poland	Caucasic white	Arabic, Central Asia
Romania	Romanian / Caucasian white	German / Gypsy / Hungarian / Negro black / Arabic, Central Asian / Other
Russia	Russian / White	Tatar / Ukrainian / Belorussian / Jew / Komi / German / Kabardians / Chechen / Ingush / Balkarets / Chuvash / Mordwin / Georgian / Armenian / Mari / Udmurt / Moldovan / Englishman / Spaniard / Italian / Chinese / French / Avarets / The Assyrian / Greek / Adygean / Cherkess / Turk / Ossetian / Hakass / Kazakh / Azeri / North-East Asian / Gypsies / Pole / Tajik / Korean / Yakut / Digorets / Latvian / Gagauz / Lezgin / Karel / Romanians / Turkmen / Tuvinac / Kyrgyz / Agul / Tabasaranec / Rutulus / Afghan / Nogayets / Andijan / Kalmyk / Cuban / Lithuanian / Abazin / Mongol / Finn / Hungary / Buryats / Lakets / Dargin / Kumyk / Czech / Vietnamese / Uzbek / Bashkir / Karachayeva / Bulgarian / Syrian / Abkhaz / Khanty / Iranian and Central Asian / Other eastern European / Other Caucasian / Other Asian / Other
Rwanda	African	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.
Serbia	Caucasian white / Serbian	Montenegrin / Yugoslav / Hungarian / Muslim / Albanian / Other
Singapore	Chinese	Caucasian white / South Asian Indian, Pakistan, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Malay / Eurasian / Others

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	Coded as Majority	Coded as Minority
South Africa	Black	White / Coloured / Indian / South Asian / East Asian / Other
South Korea	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc)	NA
Sweden	White / Swedish / Scandinavian; From Nordic countries	African \\Black / South Asia (Indians, Pakistanis, etc.) / East Asia (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) / Arabic \\Middle East / From Europe, except the Nordic countries / From Africa / From Asia / From North America / From South America / Other
Thailand	Thai	China / Malayu / Tribe / Caucasian white / Negro Black / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc. / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Other
Trinidad and Tobago	Afro-Trinidadian / Indo-Trinidadian / Negro Black / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Caucasian white / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Other / Mixed
Tunisia	Arabic	Negro Black / Tamazight (Berber) / Other
Ukraine	Ukrainians / Caucasian white	Russians / Belarusians / Tatars / Jews / Pole / Armenian / Moldova / Rusin / Hungarian / Georgian / Greek / Montenegrin / Korean / Bulgarian / Chuvash / Negro black / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Other
United Kingdom	White	Black-Caribbean / Black-African / Black-Other / Indian / Pakistani / Bangladeshi / Chinese / South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc. / East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. / Arabic, Central Asian / Mixed race / Asian / Other ethnic group
United States of America	White, non-Hispanic	Black, Non-Hispanic / Other, Non-Hispanic / Hispanic / Two plus, non-Hispanic / Asian, Non-Hispanic / South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc.) / East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) / Arabic (Central Asian)
Uruguay	Caucasian (White)	Black / South Asian (hindu, pakistani, brown) / East Asian (chinese, japanese, korean,...) / Arab (light brown) / Other
Uzbekistan	Uzbek	Russian / Tatarin / Kazakhs / Karakalpak / Tajik / Kyrgyz / Turkmen / Others
Vietnam	Kinh / Vietnamese	Muong / Hmong / Dao / Ede / Ray / Thai / Hoa / China / Other
Zambia	African	Caucasian white / South Asian, Indian, Pakistani etc.
Zimbabwe	Africans/Negro Black / Shona	Caucasian White / Coloured / Indian / Ndebele / Arabic, Central Asian / Asian, Chinese / Other