

Authoritarianism, Redistribution, and Ethnic Diversity*

Adam R. Panish[†] Stanley Feldman[‡]

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Abstract

Authoritarian predispositions are often related to support for social welfare programs, despite being key predictors of social conservatism and prejudice. Existing research argues that social welfare programs' ability to provide security and certainty makes them attractive to authoritarians. While acknowledging this perspective, we argue that authoritarians also possess a genuine pro-social orientation—but only toward those who conform to prevailing cultural norms. Therefore, we predict that authoritarians will support egalitarian policies when the salience of diversity is low but will withdraw their support for these policies when the salience of diversity is high. We also predict that this effect will be limited to members of majority ethnic groups, since only they should feel threatened by increasing diversity. We test this prediction using two longitudinal measures of ethnic diversity and data from two cross-national surveys. We find support for our hypothesis, both between countries and within countries over time.

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Correspondence: adam.panish@stonybrook.edu

[†]PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University

[‡]John S. Toll Professor, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University

1 Introduction

Disagreement over the proper distribution of resources is a constant feature of politics. Understanding the nature and origins of conflicts over resource distribution has therefore been a long-standing topic in political science. There have been many explanations advanced for why people support redistributive and progressive social welfare policies. Self-interest (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Weeden and Kurzban 2017), compassion (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Sznycer et al. 2017), altruism (Dimick, Rueda, and Stegmüller 2017; Gilens and Thal 2018), and cultural embeddedness (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom 2015) have all been shown to lead some citizens to support redistribution or social welfare policies. In this paper we show that a very different motivation—authoritarianism—may under some circumstances also increase support for egalitarian policies.

2 Authoritarianism and Economic Attitudes

For almost a century, social scientists have sought to explain why mass publics support parties and policies that restrict individual freedom. In recent decades, scholars have argued that some people are psychologically predisposed toward authoritarianism, and that this predisposition is rooted in the importance that people assign to values of social conformity and individual autonomy (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). All people support these goals to some extent — everyone wants at least a little bit of choice in how they live their life, and everyone cares at least a little bit about how chaotic and bewildering their social environment is (Gray and Durrheim 2013). But authoritarians, by virtue of their psychological needs for order and certainty, are especially likely to prioritize conformity over autonomy.¹

Because threats to the cohesion of the group are highly disturbing to authoritarians, they tend to lash out against people who deviate from social norms or challenge sources of group authority. Specifically, authoritarians tend to support policies that punish or restrict the behavior of minorities and outgroup members (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Duckitt 2001; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Peterson, Doty,

¹Duckitt (2022) notes that researchers sometimes conflate social conformity values with manifest support for authoritarianism. Unless otherwise noted, we use the word authoritarian as a shorthand for a person who is psychologically predisposed to develop authoritarian sentiments, rather than a person who endorses authoritarian policies.

and Winter 1993; Stenner 2005). In the United States authoritarians hold highly conservative views on social issues related to religion, sex, drug use, crime, and immigration, but are less consistent in their orientation towards economic issues related to redistribution and social welfare (Cizmar et al. 2014; Feldman and Johnston 2014). Some scholars have interpreted this pattern as evidence that authoritarianism is only directly relevant for the development of social policy attitudes, with spillover into the economic domain occurring either when economic policies become associated with disliked outgroups or when political elites explicitly package social and economic policies together (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Johnston and Wronski 2015). In this view, authoritarianism should be either unrelated to economic attitudes or related to right-wing economic attitudes, depending on the political context.

Contrary to these expectations, survey data collected outside of the United States has frequently uncovered relationships between authoritarianism and left-wing economic attitudes. Analyzing data from the second and third waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) spanning 59 nations, Stenner (2005; 2009) finds a small negative correlation between authoritarianism (measured using childrearing values) and a composite including items tapping opposition to income equality, a preference for private rather than public ownership of businesses, and a belief in individual rather than government responsibility for public welfare. Malka and colleagues (2014; 2019) replicate these results in the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS using a measure of authoritarianism (what they call “needs for security and certainty”) constructed from responses to the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ). Using data from the fourth and eighth rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), Arikian and Sekercioglu (2019) find that authoritarianism (again measured using the PVQ) is a substantively large and robust predictor of support for old-age, healthcare, and unemployment benefits across 27 European countries.

In a series of studies in the U.S., Johnston and colleagues (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017; Ollerenshaw 2024; Ollerenshaw and Johnston 2022) show that a closed personality orientation – which includes authoritarianism as a major component – has differential effects on economic attitudes contingent on political awareness and elite messaging. Among people with closed personalities who are high in awareness, anti-government rhetoric from Republican politicians leads to a negative relationship between closed personality and support for liberal economic policies. Importantly, among the less politically aware, Johnston et al. argue that “there is a natural tendency for closed citizens to support an active role for the government in the economy (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017, p. 14). Jedinger and Burger (2019) report similar findings in a representative Austrian sample, suggesting that this pattern is not unique to the United States.

These results cut against the view that authoritarian predispositions structure economic attitudes exclusively or even primarily through indirect pathways. People who hold right-wing social attitudes and left-wing economic attitudes make up large minorities in many nations, but their views are generally not reflected in party platforms (Benoit and Laver 2006; Cochrane 2010; Hillen and Steiner 2020; Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014). Indeed, the politicians and parties whose xenophobic appeals resonate with authoritarians rarely advocate for — and often rail against — redistribution, social welfare programs, and public insurance. Therefore, it seems unlikely that elite rhetoric alone can explain the global variation in authoritarians’ economic preferences.² This raises the question: why are authoritarians especially likely to support left-wing economic policy in some times and places and especially likely to oppose these same policies in other times and places? Malka and colleagues and Johnston, Lavine, and Federico suggest that the contingent effects of authoritarianism on economic preferences are a function of political culture and elite discourse. We supplement this explanation with another perspective on the dynamics of authoritarianism.

3 Authoritarians as Worry Cooperators

Early research on the characteristics of fascist party supporters popularized the view that authoritarians are psychologically maladjusted and antisocial (Adorno et al. 1950; Reich 1946[1933]). In contrast, anthropological research suggests that the key components of the authoritarian personality — adherence to convention, submission to authority, and aggression towards norm violators — are commonplace in every society on earth and constitute basic, innate components of human social behavior (Boehm 1999; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989, pp. 314-320). Given its widespread presence in our species and apparent social functionality, some researchers have wondered whether authoritarianism was at some point favored by natural selection.³

²Attitudes toward Social Security in the US are a notable exception. Here, the role of elite rhetoric appears to be decisive, as evidenced by the fact that the correlation between authoritarianism and support for Social Security spending increases as a function of political engagement (Macdonald 2022).

³By the same token, the fact that (a) people vary widely in their predisposition towards authoritarianism and (b) this predisposition is substantially heritable suggests that recent selection on this trait has been relatively weak (Ludeke and Krueger 2013; Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). As the intensity of selection on a trait wanes, stretches of the genome that guide its development are expected to accumulate random mutations that cause their bearers to manifest the trait in less reliable ways (O’Connor et al. 2019). By way of comparison, characteristics that must develop with excellent fidelity if a person is to stand a good chance of passing on their genes—having two eyes,

Kessler and Cohrs (2008) argue that authoritarianism was selected for its ability to foster coordination and cooperation in ancestral human groups. Their logic is as follows: By helping to promulgate highly specific and restrictive group norms regulating religious practice, clothing, speech, and behavior and punishing those who deviate from them, authoritarians force their fellow group members to join them in costly norm adherence. In doing so, they create a social environment in which easily observable but hard to fake signals indicate that a person has already invested quite a bit in the group and shares its members' knowledge, values, and intentions (Bulbulia and Sosis 2011; Sosis, Kress, and Boster 2007; Sosis and Bressler 2003). This shared worldview, in turn, minimizes the chances of conflict or misunderstanding and makes it much easier to reap the benefits of cooperation (McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003; Skyrms 2004). As McElreath et al. argue, "Social behavior in groups is regulated by norms in such a way that interactions between individuals who share beliefs about how people should behave yield higher payoffs than interactions among people with discordant beliefs" (2003, p. 122).

Because unconditionally cooperative individuals will be out-competed by free riders who accept help and give nothing in return, the first innate cooperative orientations must have combined a genuine desire to cooperate with an even stronger desire to never get cheated (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Hibbing and Alford 2004) — what Boehm (1999, p. 214) calls "vigilant sharing." This hypothetical proto-cooperative orientation shares a striking resemblance to the behavior of individuals who score high on measures of authoritarianism. When Stenner (2005) conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of extreme authoritarians from Durham, North Carolina, she was surprised to find that a quarter of these interviewees complained bitterly (and incorrectly) that they had not been paid for an earlier interview. According to Stenner, these extreme authoritarians exhibited a "systematic tendency to mistrust others, and pervasive feelings of being duped or taken for granted" (p. 212). Yet, relative to low authoritarians, high authoritarians also exhibit a lack of intentionally dishonest or manipulative behavior, a willingness to contribute to group efforts, a desire to maintain close relationships with similar others, and altruism towards family members (Heylen and Pauwels 2015; Lee et al. 2010; Sibley et al. 2010; Sinn and Hayes 2018). Additionally, Arikan (2023) finds that authoritarians are uniquely sensitive to threats to the safety of the group, as opposed to the self, consistent with Stenner's argument that authoritarians are "relentlessly sociotropic" (p. 32). Thus, in line with the evolutionary theory laid out above, authoritarians' paranoia about being cheated by norm violators appears to coincide with a genuine, if circumscribed, pro-social orientation.

for instance—are not heritable because disruptive mutations are rarely passed on.

This evolutionary perspective turns authoritarianism on its head. In this view, the social conformity sought by authoritarians is a prerequisite for within-group cooperation, rather than an end to be pursued at cooperation’s expense. If this argument is correct, then the achievement of strong group consensus built on norm adherence should also trigger cooperative orientations among authoritarians toward members of their ingroup. Support for social welfare policies that widely benefit the ingroup should therefore be supported by those high in authoritarianism as a reflection of ingroup cooperation.

4 Ethnic Diversity

If cooperative attitudes among authoritarians are a function of the successful enforcement of ingroup norms, they should be undermined in situations in which there is a widespread perception of the breakdown of social conformity. Increasingly, social diversity is the rule rather than the exception in most societies — much to the chagrin of authoritarians (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Van Assche et al. 2019; Velez and Lavine 2017). Perhaps the most salient threat to group conformity is ethnic diversity, which often reflects differences in appearance, behavior, and beliefs. Ethnic heterogeneity across space is negatively related to redistribution, prosocial behaviors, trust, and social capital (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Putnam 2007), consistent with the withdrawal of cooperation by authoritarians in the face of mounting diversity (Velez and Lavine 2017). Two examples of this pattern are the rise of “welfare chauvinism” in Europe and the Tea Party movement in the United States. In both cases, voters who support certain forms of government assistance have responded to the increasing visibility of ethnic minorities by railing against social welfare programs that allegedly benefit those undeserving of help (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Oesch 2008; Parker and Barreto 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2016). At the individual level, humans intuitively categorize one another as coalition members based on ethnic markers such as accent (Pietraszewski and Schwartz 2014a,b), as predicted by evolutionary models of cooperation (McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003). These findings suggest that ethnic homogeneity should play a crucial role in satisfying authoritarians that they are living in a cohesive, norm-bound social environment, drawing out their latent predisposition towards cooperation. Ethnic heterogeneity, meanwhile, should undermine cooperative orientations among authoritarians as social diversity leads to fears of a breakdown in shared norms and social conformity. This should provoke those high authoritarianism to withdraw support for left-wing economic policies.

5 Hypotheses

The social conformity conceptualization of authoritarianism therefore predicts that in relatively homogeneous societies authoritarianism should be positively related to support for social welfare programs that provide benefits for needy ingroup members. We do not deny the potential effects of other factors that previous research has identified as moderators of the authoritarianism-economic liberalism relationship (elite rhetoric, salience of the left-right dimension). However, *ceteris paribus*, we predict that there should be a positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for social welfare in relatively homogeneous societies.

As nations start to grow more diverse – most likely because of immigration – authoritarians will experience a threat to social conformity. As well, growing ethnic diversity will mean that social welfare benefits will flow, in part, to people who authoritarians do not consider to be part of their traditional ingroup. We therefore predict that as homogeneous societies experience an increase in diversity the positive relationship between authoritarianism and economic liberalism will disappear or even become negative (if authoritarians see social welfare benefits disproportionately going to ethnic minorities). In contrast, we argue that authoritarians who do not identify with a majority ethnic group should be less motivated to defend prevailing cultural norms (those associated with the majority group) and hence be less likely to perceive diversity as a threat to social cohesion. Therefore, our theory predicts that increasing diversity should only impact economic attitudes among authoritarians who identify with majority ethnic groups.

It is unclear what this perspective predicts for nations with a long history of diversity. On the one hand, the continuing presence of diversity may serve as an ongoing threat to authoritarians that undercuts ingroup cooperation and prosocial attitudes. It is also possible that a long history of diversity may lessen the extent to which it is threatening. And cultural assimilation across generations may reduce many of the overt signs of social norm violation from descendants of immigrant groups (Green and Staerklé 2013). While we utilize two datasets that allow us to examine changes in diversity over time, neither extends back far enough to capture the early stages of growth in minority populations in countries that have a long history of ethnic diversity. We therefore make no prediction for the relationship between authoritarianism and support for social welfare in those cases.

6 Data and Methods

We draw on two large, cross-national surveys to test our hypotheses: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the World Values Survey (WVS). Both surveys include items that allow us to measure authoritarianism and support for redistribution. This set of items was fielded in WVS waves 5-6 (2005-2013) and in ESS rounds 1-10 (2002-2022). However, our ethnic diversity data only extends to 2019 for most countries, which limits us to using ESS rounds 1-9. Both surveys also include information about respondents' ethnic identities, allowing us to test whether members of ethnic majority groups are uniquely responsive to changes in diversity.

6.1 Individual-Level Variables

To measure support for redistribution in the WVS, we use two items that ask respondents to place themselves on ten-point scales bounded by opposing statements about economic policy. The first asks respondents to choose between the statements "Incomes should be made more equal" and "There should be greater incentives for individual effort." The second asks respondents to choose between the statements "Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" and "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" (mean within-nation-year correlation = 0.20; standard deviation [SD] = 0.02). To measure support for redistribution in the ESS, we use an item that asks respondents to rate their agreement or disagreement with the statement "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" on a five-point scale.

We measure authoritarian predispositions by subtracting respondents' endorsement of autonomy values from their endorsement of conformity values (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003). Based on previous research (Arikan and Sekercioglu 2019; Claassen and McLaren 2021), we measure autonomy and conformity values using the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ). Following Arikan and Sekercioglu, we average the tradition, conformity, and security items to measure endorsement of conformity values and average the stimulation, self-direction, and hedonism items to measure endorsement of autonomy values. We then subtract respondents' autonomy scores from their conformity scores.

We also categorize respondents according to whether they are members of a majority ethnic group. In the ESS, we use respondents' subjective perception of whether they belong to the same racial or ethnic group as most people in their country. We prefer this subjective measure because it offers a more direct window into respondents' relationship with the dominant culture in their country. In the WVS, we

use respondent’s self-reported ethnic identity because this measure is available in all waves. Response options were country-specific and required that we judge whether each ethnic group constituted a majority. In cases where two or more ethnic groups formed large pluralities (e.g., Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia), we coded each group as a majority. In most Latin American countries, it was not possible to definitively link self-descriptors (e.g., mestizo, dark, light) to objective indicators of population size. Therefore, we categorized all non-African-descended and non-Indigenous respondents as majority group members (exceptions to this rule included countries in which indigenous groups form clear cultural and numeric majorities, e.g., Bolivia). Our coding of the WVS ethnicity data can be found in Appendix C in the online supplementary materials.

6.2 Country-Level Variables

6.2.1 Measuring the Salience of Ethnic Diversity

To capture the salience of ethnic diversity in European nations in the ESS data, we calculate the share of a country’s population made up of people who emigrated from a non-European Union member state during the past 10 years. We use this metric rather than the absolute number of immigrants because (a) immigrants may assimilate to local cultures over time and (b) native-born residents may acclimate to a given level of diversity over time. We use estimates from Claassen (2024) to assemble our measure of recent immigration. Claassen combines data from several administrative sources to estimate the annual number of immigrants arriving in 30 European countries from 1980-2020. We use the version of this measure that counts only people who held citizenship in a country outside of the EU or United Kingdom before emigrating. We scale the immigration variable so that each unit corresponds to an additional 1% of the population made up of immigrants from non-EU countries who arrived within the past decade.

Because Claassen’s data covers only a subset of European countries in a limited number of years, we supplement our immigration-based measure with another measure of ethnic diversity: The change in a country’s ethnic fractionalization during the past 10 years. In its most basic form, ethnic fractionalization indices capture the likelihood that two people selected at random from a population will belong to different ethnic groups (Easterly and Levine 1997). Fractionalization is calculated by summing the squared proportions of a population belonging to distinct ethnic groups and subtracting the total from 1. This operation produces a measure bounded at 0 and 1, where 0 means that every person in the population belongs to the same ethnic group and 1 means that every person in the population belongs to a different

ethnic group. We use estimates of fractionalization from Dražanová (2020), which are available annually for most countries from 1945 through 2013, to calculate the net change in fractionalization during the preceding decade. The resulting fractionalization variable is bounded at -1 and 1, where -1 means that a country went from maximally diverse to completely homogenous during the past 10 years and 1 means that a country went from completely homogenous to maximally diverse.

6.2.2 Other Country-Level Variables

Authoritarianism has been found to predict left-wing economic attitudes to a much greater extent in post-Communist nations than elsewhere (Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005; Kossowska and Van Hiel 2003; McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina-Paap 1992; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). To ensure that the inclusion of post-Communist countries does not bias our results, we control for post-Communist status in our analyses. Additionally, there is evidence that the relationship between psychological predispositions and political attitudes is shaped, both directly and indirectly, by economic development (Malka et al. 2014; Malka, Lelkes, and Soto 2019; Sibley, Osborne, and Duckitt 2012). We include annual gross domestic product per capita reported by the World Bank to proxy economic development. We also report models controlling for authoritarianism’s interactions with each of these variables in the online supplementary materials (Tables B1 and B2).

7 Analysis

Do authoritarians living in ethnically homogenous societies prefer policies that promote economic equality, only to reject redistribution when the salience of ethnic diversity increases? To answer this question, we first turn to the ESS data, which includes observations spanning thirty-two European countries and seventeen years (2002-2018). We start by estimating four multilevel linear models with country and year random intercepts.⁴ The dependent variable in each model is support for redistribution, scaled to range from 0 to 1. The focal independent variables are au-

⁴The ethnic minorities model using the immigration measure displayed singular fit. Inspection of the random effects revealed that the year variance component was estimated at precisely zero. Therefore, we re-estimated the model without the random intercept for year. This version of the model did not exhibit singularity. The estimates that we report in the main text and appendix are from this simplified model. We observed no differences between the fixed effects estimates in the full and simplified models.

thoritarianism, a measure of ethnic diversity salience, and the interaction between authoritarianism and diversity salience. We estimate two models for each of our measures of diversity salience—one among self-identified ethnic majority respondents and one among self-identified ethnic minority respondents. In each model, we also control for age, gender, education, income, religiosity, and two country-level variables: post-communist status and log GDP per capita. In Appendix B, we report versions of these models that include interactions between authoritarianism and both country-level control variables to ensure that authoritarianism’s interaction with diversity salience is not confounded by interactions with post-communist status or economic development. Adding these controls leaves our results substantively unchanged (Tables B1 and B2). Therefore, we focus on the results from our more straightforward model specifications here.

We plot the predicted values from the four multilevel models in Fig. 1. We report the full output from these models in Table A1 in the online supplementary materials. The solid lines show the relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution in times and places where the salience of ethnic diversity is low—at the fifth percentile in the ESS sample, where less than 1% of the population are recent non-EU immigrants and fractionalization has decreased by 0.029 during the past decade. The dashed lines show the same relationship when the salience of ethnic diversity is high—at the ninety-fifth percentile in the ESS sample, where about 9% of the population are recent non-EU immigrants and fractionalization has increased by about one tenth of its scale.

The results confirm our hypotheses. Looking first at members of majority ethnic groups, the left-hand panels of Fig. 1 show that the most authoritarian respondents support redistribution more than the least authoritarian respondents when the salience of ethnic diversity is low (top left: $b = .17$, $SE = .009$; bottom left: $b = .21$, $SE = .01$). These differences in redistribution preferences are sizeable, corresponding to 0.67 standard deviations in the immigration model and 0.84 standard deviations in the fractionalization model. When the salience of ethnic diversity is high, the marginal effect of authoritarianism shrinks considerably and becomes non-significant in the immigration model (top left: $b = .01$, $SE = .01$; bottom left: $b = .06$, $SE = .01$). As Fig. 1 shows, this change is due almost entirely to authoritarians withdrawing their support for redistribution.⁵ Consistent with our argument that authoritarians’ response to diversity is contingent on their identification with the dominant culture, the salience of diversity has no effect on the relationship between

⁵Non-authoritarians appear to support redistribution slightly more when diversity is salient in the immigration model (top left panel of Fig. 1). However, this effect is small and does not replicate in the fractionalization model (bottom left panel of Fig. 1).




Figure 1: Predicted values of support for redistribution as a function of authoritarianism at high and low levels of ethnic diversity salience. The left-hand panels show estimates for members of the ethnic majority and the right-hand panel show estimates for members of ethnic minorities. Data from the ESS from 2002 to 2019. For full model output see Table A1.

authoritarianism and redistribution among ethnic minorities as shown in the right-hand panels of Fig. 1.⁶ These results hold true whether diversity is measured using immigration or fractionalization.

Next, we turn to the WVS data. This dataset spans 56 countries, allowing us to broaden our analysis beyond Europe. Because immigration data is unavailable for most of the countries in the WVS, we focus on the impact of fractionalization. As before, we estimate multilevel linear models predicting support for redistribution, scaled to range from 0 to 1. We estimate two models—one among members of ethnic majority and plurality groups and one among members of ethnic minority groups.

We plot the predicted values from these models in Fig. 2. The full model output can be found in Table A2 in the online supplementary materials. As before, the solid lines show the relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution in times and places where the salience of ethnic diversity is very low—at the fifth percentile in the WVS sample, where fractionalization has decreased by about 0.06 units in the past decade—and the dashed lines show the relationship where the salience of ethnic diversity is very high—at the ninety-fifth percentile, where fractionalization has increased by about 0.06 units in the past decade.

As in the ESS, the results for members of the ethnic majority support our hypotheses. When the salience of ethnic diversity is low, the most authoritarian WVS respondents support redistribution more than the least authoritarian respondents—a difference of 0.70 standard deviations ($b = .18$, $SE = .01$). But when the salience of ethnic diversity is high, this pattern reverses such that the most authoritarian respondents support redistribution slightly less than the least authoritarian ($b = -.04$, $SE = .01$).⁷

The estimates for members of ethnic minorities are somewhat different than we obtained from the ESS data. When ethnic diversity is low, we again find a substantial positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for redistribution ($b = .12$; $SE = .03$). Unlike the ESS estimates, however, the marginal effect of authoritarianism becomes somewhat negative (though not significantly so) when ethnic diversity is high, contrary to our prediction ($b = -.03$, $SE = .04$).⁸ We think there are at least two explanations for this discrepancy between the two datasets. First, we

⁶The interaction terms are statistically significant in both ethnic majority models (top left: $b = -0.01$, $SE = .002$; bottom left: $b = -1.21$, $SE = .14$) but are not statistically significant in either of the ethnic minority models (top right: $b = .004$, $SE = .01$; bottom right: $b = -.49$, $SE = .57$).

⁷As in the ESS analyses, the interaction term is statistically significant in the ethnic majorities model (left panel: $b = -1.70$; $SE = .18$).

⁸The interaction term in the ethnic minorities model is statistically significant—albeit smaller and with a larger standard error than in the majorities/pluralities model (right panel: $b = -1.03$; $SE = .42$).




Figure 2: Predicted values of support for redistribution as a function of authoritarianism at high and low levels of ethnic diversity salience. The left-hand panels show estimates for members of the ethnic majority and the right-hand panel show estimates for members of ethnic minorities. Data from the WVS from 2005 to 2013. For full model output see Table A2.

were able to use self-perceptions of membership in the ethnic majority group in the ESS data. Since that measure wasn't available in the WVS we assigned people to ethnic majority/minority status based on their reported ethnicity. The self-perception measure is preferable since our predictions are based on peoples' identification with the majority group. It is possible that some of the respondents we coded as members of ethnic minorities in fact identify with the majority group. Second, the WVS includes nations with large ethnic subpopulations which makes it more difficult to identify members of the majority group.

Despite this one discrepancy, tests of our predictions for members of national majority groups were perfectly consistent across two large datasets and, for the ESS data, two different measures of changes in ethnic diversity over time.

Our analyses in this section have used time-series, cross-sectional data. Our estimates thus combine overtime variation within nations with variance between nations. The cross-sectional component of our data leaves open the possibility that unmeasured variables could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. One or more variables associated with ethnic diversity cross-nationally may be responsible for the results we have just presented. To address this concern, we now turn to within

country tests of our hypothesis. By focusing on overtime variation in single nations we are effectively holding constant unmeasured factors that may vary across nations.

8 The European Migrant Crisis: A Case Study

According to our theory, authoritarians should continually update their attitudes toward redistribution as cultural diversity becomes more or less salient. Sudden changes in the visibility of immigrants in one's locale should be particularly threatening to authoritarians' sense of social order. The 2015 European migrant crisis provides a strong test of this prediction.

Starting in 2011, growing numbers of Syrians and Libyans fled their countries' civil wars for southern Europe. When the Islamic State invaded Iraq in 2014, what had been a trickle of immigration became an exodus. The number of migrants entering the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland surged from about 300,000 in 2014 to 1.8 million in 2015, a majority of whom were of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi origin (Buonanno 2017). Right-wing populists throughout Europe framed the crisis as an invasion, warning that Islam would displace local cultures if the migrants were allowed to stay (Norris and Inglehart 2019, pp. 182-187). Yet, while backlash against immigrants was widespread, countries varied considerably in the number of migrants that they received, the timing of their arrival, and the proportion of migrants who resided in the country for an extended period of time. Thus, while all Europeans were aware of the migrant crisis and were exposed to anti-immigrant rhetoric, different European populations encountered migrants in their communities at different times and to different degrees. This variation is reflected in our immigration-based index of diversity salience, which counts only emigrants who took up long-term residence in the destination country.

To explore whether authoritarians react to changes in diversity by withdrawing support for redistribution, we return to the ESS data. Using OLS, we regress economic attitudes on authoritarianism and demographic controls separately in each country-year sample. These models are estimated only on respondents who identified as members of an ethnic majority. In Fig. 3, we plot the marginal effects from these models alongside our immigration-based diversity measure for six European countries: Austria, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. We focus on these countries because their results help to illustrate three key aspects of our argument: (1) The relationship between authoritarianism and left-wing economic attitudes remains positive in countries that accepted few migrants but declines in countries that accepted many migrants, as seen in the contrast between Hungary and Sweden; (2) Among countries that experienced roughly similar increases in re-

cent non-EU immigrants per capita, it was only where the majority of migrants were culturally dissimilar from the receiving country’s population that the relationship between authoritarianism and economic attitudes shifted, as seen in the contrast between Finland and Norway; and (3) The relationship between authoritarianism and economic attitudes responds dynamically to diversity within countries, as seen in Austria and the Netherlands.

We first turn to the panels on the left side of Fig. 3, which show results for Sweden and Hungary. As can be seen in the bottom left panel, the share of the Hungarian population comprised of recent non-EU immigrants has not changed much during the twenty-first century; in fact, this statistic is nearly identical in 2004 (1.61%) and 2018 (1.64%). Hungary is unique among European countries for having denied the vast majority of asylum applications in 2015 and 2016, either ferrying migrants to Austria or detaining them near the Serbian border (Eurostat Press Office 2016, 2017b; Human Rights Watch 2015; Smale, Lyman, and Hartocollis 2015). In contrast, Sweden had already granted residence to hundreds of thousands of migrants of Middle Eastern and East African origin in the decade before the migrant crisis struck (Lindsay 2021). As a result, their population share of recent non-EU immigrants rose from a low of 3.74% in 2004 to 7.06% in 2018. Sweden’s liberal approach to detaining asylum applicants and generous granting of permanent residence meant that immigrants were relatively free to move about the country and hence highly visible in Swedish society (International Detention Coalition 2015; Lindsay 2021). The results shown in Fig. 3 suggest that these differences had major consequences for the relationship between people’s psychological predispositions and their economic attitudes. In Hungary, the marginal effect of authoritarianism on support for redistribution fluctuates from year to year but trends upwards overall, rising from .12 in 2004 to .26 in 2018. By contrast, the marginal effect among Swedes declines nearly monotonically between 2004 and 2018, falling from .21 to .02 as the proportion of recently arrived immigrants grows.

Results for Norway and Finland, shown in the two center panels of Fig. 3, provide evidence from another pair of countries with different immigration experiences. In terms of the rate of change in immigration salience, Norway and Finland look relatively similar; whereas Sweden’s share of recent immigrants increased by 3.32 percentage points from 2004 to 2018, Norway’s and Finland’s increased by 1.68 and 1.15 percentage points, respectively. However, Finland is unique in that a plurality of the non-EU migrants granted citizenship there were previously citizens of Russia, a country that borders Finland and shares some aspects of its culture and heritage. This was not the case in Norway and Sweden, where the largest migrant groups were Eritrean and Iraqi, respectively (Eurostat Press Office 2017a). Given that ethnic and culturally differences between Fins and Russians are, on average, far less salient




Figure 3: Marginal effects of authoritarianism on support for redistribution in six European nations. Estimates are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Lines denoting immigrants per capita are local polynomial regression lines. Immigration rates are multiplied by 10 for visual comparison. All models include controls for age, gender, education, income, and religiosity. Data are from the ESS, ethnic majority respondents only. For full model output see Tables A3 and A8.

than differences between Norwegians and Eritreans, we would expect our diversity measure to have less of an impact in Finland. We show the results for Finland in the bottom center panel of Fig. 3. In line with our expectations, the marginal effect of authoritarianism remains stable and significantly positive even in the aftermath of the migrant crisis. By contrast, the results for Norway—shown in the top center panel—resemble those for Sweden. As the salience of ethnic diversity in Norway increased from 2002 to 2018, the marginal effect of authoritarianism dropped from .24 to .05.

The results for Austria and the Netherlands, shown in the two right-most panels of Fig. 3, provide a particularly strong test of our hypothesis. They allow us to check whether the relationship between authoritarianism and egalitarianism becomes more positive when societies become less diverse. Migration to the Netherlands slowed considerably in the early 2000s, such that the country’s share of recently arrived non-EU immigrants had been falling continually for over a decade when the migrant crisis struck. As the visibility of new arrivals fell, the marginal effect of authoritarianism on economic attitudes steadily climbed from .0 to .20—only to fall back to .0 in 2015. The same pattern appears among Austrians. As the proportion of recent migrants fell from 2006 to 2014, the marginal effect of authoritarianism increased from .12 to .18. But with the influx of migrants in 2015, the marginal effect immediately drops to .0 the following year. The parameter estimates for Austria and the Netherlands also show how responsive those high in authoritarianism are to changes in ethnic diversity. The increases in the marginal effect estimates begin to decrease rapidly just as soon as immigration levels begin to rise.

9 Conclusions

The dominant perspective on authoritarianism focuses on its connections to intolerance, prejudice, and ethnocentrism. In this paper we have argued that, under some circumstances, authoritarianism may also motivate support for social welfare programs that benefit ingroup members. Extending the perspective of authoritarians as wary cooperators, we predicted and found evidence that authoritarianism is positively related to egalitarian attitudes and support for redistribution. The critical factor that moderates the strength of this relationship is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The social conformity that authoritarians value is threatened by immigration that increases the perception of diversity in society. This in turn reduces authoritarians’ support for social welfare and redistributive policies.

We have presented results from two modeling strategies that strongly support these predictions. Estimates from cross-sectional, time-series models with two large

datasets yield substantively large positive effects of authoritarianism on measures of redistribution attitudes in nations that have not experienced large increases in immigration. The marginal effect of authoritarianism goes to zero as immigration grows large. While we speculated that the marginal effects of authoritarianism on redistribution attitudes might become negative in nations with high ethnic diversity, we do not see clear evidence of that in our estimates. There is abundant evidence that those high in authoritarianism respond to growing diversity by becoming more ethnocentric and intolerant; we do not see evidence that they also oppose redistributive policies any more than do those low in authoritarianism.

We demonstrate the robustness of these results with estimates from within nation models. This approach eliminates the threat of unmeasured variables in the cross-national estimates and takes advantage of country specific differences in the amount and timing of immigration. Using ESS data from 2002 to 2018, we show that the marginal effect of authoritarianism on support for redistribution is quite sensitive to changes in immigration. Consistent with estimates from the cross-national data, there is a positive marginal effect of authoritarianism when nations have not experienced significant amounts of immigration in the past decade. As immigration grows, the effect of authoritarianism on redistributive attitudes again declines to near zero. While we do not have the data needed to adequately examine this, the comparison of Finland and Norway suggests that immigration from very difficult culture and religions (North Africa and the Middle East in the case of Norway) depressed authoritarian support for redistribution while immigration from a country with a similar culture (Russia immigration to Finland) did not.

Most generally, these results support the social cohesion model of authoritarianism that has developed a growing body of empirical support (Feldman and Weber 2023). Those high in authoritarianism prioritize social cohesion over personal autonomy and are sensitive to threats to cohesion. A large body of research has shown that responses to those threats can generate hostility toward the perceived cause of the disruption to social cohesion. As we have shown here, the same motivation can, in stable, homogeneous societies, result in support for economic policies that benefit ingroup members.

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Online Appendix for “Authoritarianism, Redistribution, and Ethnic Diversity”

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A Full Regression Output for Figures

Table A1: Model Output for Figure 1

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>				
	Δ Non-EU Immigration		Δ Fractionalization	
	Majorities	Minorities	Majorities	Minorities
Fixed Effects				
Authoritarianism x Diversity Salience	-.020 (.002)***	.003 (.010)	-1.215 (.143)***	-.491 (.571)
Authoritarianism	.189 (.010)***	.101 (.050)*	.179 (.007)***	.201 (.026)***
Diversity Salience	.007 (.001)***	-.004 (.006)	.141 (0.123)	.245 (0.414)
Post-Communist	-.088 (.028)**	.028 (.035)	.044 (.029)	.052 (.032)
GDP (log)	-.093 (.007)***	-.010 (.016)	.019 (.005)***	-.007 (.014)
Age	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)
Gender	-.034 (.001)***	-.016 (.005)**	-.030 (.001)***	-.016 (.005)***
Education	-.065 (.002)***	-.044 (.010)***	-.066 (.002)***	-.034 (.009)***
Income	-.105 (.002)***	-.086 (.010)***	-.095 (.002)***	-.085 (.009)***
Religiosity	-.022 (.002)***	-.008 (.009)	-.019 (.002)***	.003 (.008)
(Intercept)	1.710 (.073)***	.829 (.173)***	.533 (.059)***	.754 (.144)***
Random Effects				
σ^2	.059	.060	.058	.052
τ_{00} (Country)	.003	.004	.006	.004
τ_{00} (Year)	.001	—†	.000	.000
ICC	.064	.058	.093	.072
N (Country)	25	25	32	32
N (Year)	9	—†	6	6
Observations	191,590	8,514	164,299	9,754
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	.064 / .124	.032 / .087	.051 / .139	.060 / .127

Note: Fixed effects are unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. † Random intercept estimated at precisely 0 dropped, model re-estimated to avoid singular fit. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A2: Model Output for Figure 2

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>	
	Majorities	Minorities
Fixed Effects		
Authoritarianism x Diversity Salience	-1.699 (.178)***	-1.030 (.424)*
Authoritarianism	.069 (.007)***	.035 (.017)*
Diversity Salience	.478 (.321)	.408 (.445)
Post-Communist	.004 (.034)	.064 (.039)
GDP (log)	.062 (.007)***	.024 (.012)*
Age	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Gender	-.010 (.002)***	-.009 (.004)*
Education	-.033 (.003)***	-.037 (.007)***
Income	-.152 (.004)***	-.152 (.010)***
Religiosity	-.014 (.003)***	.011 (.008)
(Intercept)	.030 (.067)	.374 (.105)***
Random Effects		
σ^2	.058	.057
τ_{00} (Country)	.009	.008
τ_{00} (Year)	.001	.002
ICC	.152	.148
N (Country)	56	50
N (Year)	8	8
Observations	80,277	15,138
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	.091 / .229	.036 / .179

Note: Fixed effects are unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A3: Model Output for Figure 3 — Sweden

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	.191*** (.057)	.213*** (.059)	.176** (.058)	.131* (.062)	.106 (.063)	.117* (.054)	.032 (.054)	.071 (.060)	.022 (.061)
Age	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.001 (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001* (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)
Gender	-.083*** (.012)	-.047*** (.012)	-.092*** (.012)	-.059*** (.012)	-.047*** (.013)	-.072*** (.011)	-.045*** (.012)	-.060*** (.012)	-.037** (.013)
Education	-.092*** (.019)	-.063** (.020)	-.113*** (.020)	-.085*** (.020)	-.105*** (.030)	-.046 (.026)	-.052 (.027)	.002 (.028)	.017 (.029)
Income	-.152*** (.037)	-.209*** (.036)	-.173*** (.035)	-.081*** (.024)	-.099*** (.021)	-.103*** (.019)	-.075*** (.019)	-.110*** (.021)	-.094*** (.025)
Religiosity	-.032 (.022)	.008 (.022)	-.025 (.023)	-.042 (.023)	-.021 (.024)	.012 (.020)	.004 (.022)	-.035 (.023)	-.061* (.024)
(Intercept)	.773*** (.037)	.754*** (.038)	.849*** (.038)	.720*** (.038)	.716*** (.037)	.693*** (.034)	.742*** (.036)	.676*** (.037)	.679*** (.040)
Observations	1,488	1,489	1,407	1,388	1,257	1,553	1,496	1,310	1,288
R ²	.09	.07	.11	.07	.07	.09	.04	.06	.03
Adj. R ²	.08	.06	.11	.06	.07	.08	.03	.06	.03

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A4: Model Output for Figure 3 — Norway

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	.236*** (.053)	.216*** (.065)	.209*** (.060)	.234*** (.066)	.085 (.062)	.117 (.061)	.228*** (.067)	.147* (.064)	.049 (.062)
Age	.001** (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001* (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Gender	-.048*** (.012)	-.053*** (.013)	-.065*** (.013)	-.060*** (.014)	-.061*** (.014)	-.049*** (.013)	-.031* (.014)	-.037** (.014)	-.085*** (.014)
Education	-.066** (.022)	-.067** (.024)	-.082*** (.023)	-.084*** (.025)	-.098** (.030)	-.067* (.029)	.009 (.032)	.004 (.031)	.011 (.032)
Income	-.077* (.030)	-.111** (.035)	-.156*** (.034)	-.107*** (.027)	-.127*** (.024)	-.114*** (.022)	-.090*** (.024)	-.093*** (.024)	-.084*** (.024)
Religiosity	-.033 (.023)	.000 (.026)	-.081** (.026)	-.090*** (.027)	-.032 (.026)	-.035 (.024)	.007 (.027)	-.056* (.026)	-.067* (.027)
(Intercept)	.628*** (.037)	.678*** (.043)	.738*** (.043)	.659*** (.042)	.653*** (.038)	.608*** (.038)	.486*** (.042)	.626*** (.041)	.706*** (.041)
Observations	1,680	1,433	1,400	1,238	1,386	1,440	1,275	1,355	1,146
R ²	.06	.05	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07	.03	.06
Adj. R ²	.06	.05	.06	.07	.07	.06	.06	.02	.06

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A5: Model Output for Figure 3 — The Netherlands

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	.013 (.063)	.045 (.071)	-.095 (.075)	.165* (.071)	-.015 (.077)	.083 (.076)	.189** (.073)	.004 (.069)	-.059 (.072)
Age	.000 (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001* (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001 (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.003*** (.000)
Gender	-.037** (.012)	-.034* (.014)	.019 (.014)	-.031* (.014)	-.027 (.015)	-.032* (.014)	.017 (.014)	.022 (.014)	-.055*** (.014)
Education	-.094*** (.020)	-.074*** (.022)	-.064** (.023)	-.041 (.023)	-.084** (.032)	-.033 (.030)	-.034 (.029)	-.022 (.031)	-.045 (.029)
Income	-.207*** (.034)	-.319*** (.038)	-.244*** (.038)	-.187*** (.026)	-.199*** (.027)	-.212*** (.025)	-.204*** (.025)	-.199*** (.026)	-.166*** (.025)
Religiosity	-.017 (.021)	.000 (.024)	-.027 (.023)	.009 (.024)	.004 (.024)	-.029 (.023)	-.012 (.023)	.007 (.023)	-.002 (.024)
(Intercept)	.764*** (.039)	.723*** (.044)	.776*** (.044)	.610*** (.043)	.684*** (.045)	.681*** (.043)	.573*** (.043)	.673*** (.042)	.704*** (.044)
Observations	1,877	1,481	1,483	1,382	1,338	1,411	1,487	1,365	1,236
R ²	.06	.11	.06	.09	.10	.08	.09	.08	.10
Adj. R ²	.06	.11	.06	.08	.09	.08	.09	.08	.09

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.
 $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A6: Model Output for Figure 3 — Hungary

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	—	.116 (.069)	—	.131 (.080)	.252*** (.069)	.212** (.071)	.121 (.076)	.165* (.081)	.259*** (.069)
Age	—	.000 (.000)	—	-.001 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.001 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Gender	—	-.017 (.012)	—	-.009 (.015)	-.021 (.012)	-.039** (.013)	.014 (.013)	.020 (.014)	-.009 (.013)
Education	—	-.048* (.023)	—	-.037 (.029)	-.180*** (.036)	-.054 (.037)	-.055 (.037)	-.073 (.045)	-.037 (.041)
Income	—	-.197*** (.057)	—	-.035 (.031)	-.007 (.023)	-.018 (.023)	-.075** (.023)	.006 (.023)	-.059** (.023)
Religiosity	—	-.017 (.021)	—	.045 (.024)	-.065** (.020)	-.113*** (.021)	.017 (.024)	.031 (.024)	-.081*** (.023)
(Intercept)	—	.879*** (.041)	—	.798*** (.046)	.858*** (.040)	.782*** (.044)	.833*** (.046)	.789*** (.050)	.768*** (.044)
Observations	—	1,078	—	958	1,065	1,259	1,009	855	927
R ²	—	.03	—	.02	.05	.04	.02	.01	.04
Adj. R ²	—	.03	—	.01	.04	.03	.02	.01	.03

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.
 $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A7: Model Output for Figure 3 — Finland

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>								
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	.092 (.060)	.154* (.065)	.207** (.075)	.100 (.055)	.175** (.061)	.059 (.052)	.120* (.055)	.118* (.051)	.134* (.053)
Age	.001* (.000)	.001* (.000)	.001** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Gender	-.067*** (.013)	-.075*** (.014)	-.027 (.016)	-.047*** (.012)	-.026* (.013)	-.052*** (.011)	-.040*** (.012)	-.054*** (.011)	-.056*** (.012)
Education	-.111*** (.020)	-.120*** (.021)	-.085*** (.024)	-.067*** (.018)	-.092*** (.027)	-.084*** (.024)	-.122*** (.026)	-.067** (.025)	-.108*** (.026)
Income	-.117** (.038)	-.180*** (.037)	-.055 (.046)	-.094*** (.021)	-.105*** (.022)	-.065*** (.020)	-.060** (.021)	-.123*** (.020)	-.119*** (.021)
Religiosity	.002 (.027)	.003 (.027)	-.040 (.031)	-.034 (.023)	.000 (.024)	.002 (.021)	-.030 (.022)	-.013 (.021)	-.011 (.022)
(Intercept)	.818*** (.038)	.767*** (.040)	.662*** (.049)	.752*** (.034)	.687*** (.036)	.734*** (.032)	.740*** (.034)	.739*** (.032)	.742*** (.033)
Observations	1,539	1,502	992	1,683	1,444	1,950	1,835	1,745	1,539
R ²	.07	.10	.07	.07	.08	.06	.05	.07	.10
Adj. R ²	.07	.10	.07	.07	.08	.06	.05	.07	.10

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A8: Model Output for Figure 3 — Austria

<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Authoritarianism	.105 (.062)	.107 (.065)	.123 (.069)	—	—	—	.183** (.064)	.023 (.059)	.049 (.050)
Age	-.001** (.001)	.000 (.001)	.000 (.000)	—	—	—	-.001 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Gender	-.043** (.015)	-.067*** (.016)	-.051*** (.015)	—	—	—	-.027* (.013)	-.041** (.013)	-.033** (.011)
Education	-.107** (.034)	-.076 (.039)	-.088* (.038)	—	—	—	-.076* (.036)	-.019 (.040)	.003 (.031)
Income	-.177*** (.043)	-.203*** (.044)	-.023 (.040)	—	—	—	-.040 (.025)	-.026 (.025)	-.077*** (.020)
Religiosity	-.054 (.028)	-.050 (.029)	-.036 (.028)	—	—	—	-.062** (.023)	-.047* (.023)	-.056** (.019)
(Intercept)	.884*** (.044)	.862*** (.041)	.734*** (.043)	—	—	—	.806*** (.041)	.770*** (.041)	.800*** (.035)
Observations	1,253	1,085	1,261	—	—	—	1,258	1,358	1,865
R ²	.04	.05	.02	—	—	—	.02	.01	.02
Adj. R ²	.04	.05	.02	—	—	—	.02	.01	.02

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses.
 $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

B Controlling for Country-Level Confounders

Table B1: ESS Models Controlling for Country-Level Confounders

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>			
	Δ Non-EU Immigration		Δ Fractionalization	
	Majorities	Minorities	Majorities	Minorities
Fixed Effects				
Authoritarianism x Diversity Salience	-.011 (.002)***	.016 (.013)	-.342 (.162)*	.394 (.628)
Authoritarianism x Post-Communist	.223 (.021)***	.098 (.103)	.230 (.019)***	.292 (.069)***
Authoritarianism x GDP (log)	.088 (.015)***	-.024 (.075)	.068 (.010)***	.118 (.041)**
Authoritarianism	-.807 (.155)***	.277 (.798)	-.605 (.111)***	-1.124 (.429)**
Diversity Salience	.002 (.001)	-.010 (.007)	-.302 (.129)*	.230 (.436)
Post-Communist	-.207 (.031)***	-.026 (.065)	-.082 (.031)**	-.115 (.050)*
GDP (log)	-.139 (.010)***	.003 (.042)	.020 (.008)*	-.076 (.027)**
Age	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)
Gender	-.034 (.001)***	-.016 (.005)**	-.030 (.001)***	-.015 (.005)**
Education	-.066 (.002)***	-.045 (.010)***	-.067 (.002)***	-.035 (.009)***
Income	-.104 (.002)***	-.085 (.010)***	-.094 (.002)***	-.085 (.009)***
Religiosity	-.022 (.002)***	-.007 (.009)	-.018 (.002)***	.004 (.008)
(Intercept)	2.226 (.108)***	.738 (.446)	.971 (.086)***	1.528 (.281)***
Random Effects				
σ^2	.061	.060	.058	.052
τ_{00} (Country)	.003	.004	.006	.004
τ_{00} (Year)	.001	— [†]	.000	.000
ICC	.065	.058	.092	.070
N (Country)	25	25	32	32
N (Year)	9	— [†]	6	6
Observations	191,590	8,514	164,299	9,754
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	.064 / .124	.032 / .088	.052 / .139	.062 / .128

Note: Fixed effects are unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. [†] Random intercept estimated at precisely 0 dropped, model re-estimated to avoid singular fit. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table B2: WVS Models Controlling for Country-Level Confounders

	<i>DV: Left-Wing Economic Attitudes</i>	
	Majorities	Minorities
Fixed Effects		
Authoritarianism x Diversity Salience	-1.323 (.207)***	-1.294 (.570)*
Authoritarianism x Post-Communist	.107 (.017)***	.066 (.053)
Authoritarianism x GDP (log)	-.003 (.006)	.041 (.016)**
Authoritarianism	.072 (.053)	-.336 (.137)*
Diversity Salience	.256 (.330)	.553 (.498)
Post-Communist	-.059 (.036)	.025 (.050)
GDP (log)	.066 (.008)***	.000 (.015)
Age	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Gender	-.010 (.002)***	-.009 (.004)*
Education	-.033 (.003)***	-.037 (.007)***
Income	-.151 (.004)***	-.151 (.010)***
Religiosity	-.014 (.003)***	-.013 (.008)
(Intercept)	.013 (.074)	.586 (.130)***
Random Effects		
σ^2	.058	.057
τ_{00} (Country)	.010	.008
τ_{00} (Year)	.001	.002
ICC	.157	.148
N (Country)	.56	.50
N (Year)	.8	.8
Observations	80,277	15,138
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	.094 / .236	.037 / .179

Note: Fixed effects are unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

C Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Albania	Christian	Minority
Albania	Greek	Minority
Albania	Macedonian	Minority
Albania	Other	Minority
Albania	Albanian	Majority
Algeria	Kabyle	Minority
Algeria	Chaoui	Minority
Algeria	Other (Berber)	Minority
Algeria	Other	Minority
Algeria	Arabe	Majority
Andorra	Negro black	Minority
Andorra	South Asian (Indian, Pakistani..)	Minority
Andorra	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese...)	Minority
Andorra	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Andorra	Other	Minority
Andorra	Caucasian white	Majority
Argentina	Black	Minority
Argentina	Indigenous	Minority
Argentina	Other	Minority
Argentina	White	Majority
Argentina	Light brown	Majority
Argentina	Dark brown	Majority
Armenia	Greek	Minority
Armenia	Jew	Minority
Armenia	Kurd/Esid	Minority
Armenia	Russian	Minority
Armenia	Yazidis	Minority
Armenia	Other	Minority
Armenia	Armenian	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Australia	South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc)	Minority
Australia	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc)	Minority
Australia	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Australia	Thai, Vietnamese, Malaysian, etc	Minority
Australia	Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander	Minority
Australia	Other	Minority
Australia	Australian (English speaking)	Majority
Australia	European	Majority
Australia	White	Majority
Azerbaijan	Avarian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Chekh	Minority
Azerbaijan	Iranian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Jew	Minority
Azerbaijan	Lezgin	Minority
Azerbaijan	Moldovian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Russian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Spanish	Minority
Azerbaijan	Tatarian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Turkmenian	Minority
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijani	Majority
Azerbaijan	Caucasian white	Majority
Bangladesh	Hindu	Minority
Bangladesh	Christian	Minority
Bangladesh	Chakma	Minority
Bangladesh	Murong	Minority
Bangladesh	Pathan	Minority
Bangladesh	Punjabi	Minority
Bangladesh	Sindhi	Minority
Bangladesh	Urdu Speaking	Minority
Bangladesh	Other	Minority
Bangladesh	South Asia (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Indian)	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Bangladesh	Muslim	Majority
Bangladesh	Bengali	Majority
Belarus	Polish	Minority
Belarus	Russian	Minority
Belarus	Ukrainian	Minority
Belarus	Other	Minority
Belarus	Belorussian	Majority
Belgium	Asian	Minority
Belgium	Asian - Central (Arabic)	Minority
Belgium	Black-Other / Black	Minority
Belgium	White / Caucasian White	Majority
Bolivia	Guarani	Minority
Bolivia	Chiquitano	Minority
Bolivia	Mojeno	Minority
Bolivia	Afroboliviano	Minority
Bolivia	Indigenous with no further detail	Minority
Bolivia	Other	Minority
Bolivia	Not pertaining to Indigenous groups	Minority
Bolivia	Quechua	Plurality
Bolivia	Aymara	Plurality
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatian	Minority
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian	Minority
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Other	Minority
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Bosnian/ Muslim	Majority
Brazil	Negro (Black)	Minority
Brazil	Chines, Japanese,...	Minority
Brazil	Indigenous	Minority
Brazil	South Asian	Minority
Brazil	Arabic	Minority
Brazil	Half breed of black and white	Majority
Brazil	Other	Minority
Brazil	Caucasian (White)	Majority
Brazil	Brown - Moreno ou pardo	Majority
Brazil	Half breed of white and indian	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Bulgaria	Gypsy	Minority
Bulgaria	Turkish	Minority
Bulgaria	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc	Minority
Bulgaria	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Bulgaria	Other	Minority
Bulgaria	Bulgarian	Majority
Bulgaria	Caucasian white	Majority
Burkina Faso	Caucasian white	Minority
Burkina Faso	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc	Minority
Burkina Faso	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc	Minority
Burkina Faso	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Burkina Faso	Other	Minority
Burkina Faso	Negro Black	Majority
Canada	Black (African, African- American, etc.)	Minority
Canada	West Asian (Iranian, Afghan, etc.)	Minority
Canada	Southeast Asian (Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, etc.)	Minority
Canada	Arabic (Central Asia)	Minority
Canada	South Asian (Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)	Minority
Canada	Latin American / Hispanic	Minority
Canada	Aboriginal / First Nations	Minority
Canada	Chinese	Minority
Canada	Filipino	Minority
Canada	Korean	Minority
Canada	Japanese	Minority
Canada	French	Minority
Canada	German	Minority
Canada	Italian	Minority
Canada	Polish	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Canada	East Asian Chinese,Japanese	Minority
Canada	Other	Minority
Canada	Caucasian (White)	Majority
Canada	European - English	Majority
Chile	Black	Minority
Chile	South Asian (hindu, pakistani, brown)	Minority
Chile	East Asian (chinese, japanese, korean,..)	Minority
Chile	Arab (light brown)	Minority
Chile	Indigenous	Minority
Chile	Asiatic	Minority
Chile	Indian	Minority
Chile	Mulatto(a)	Minority
Chile	Other	Minority
Chile	White, Caucasian	Majority
Chile	Mestizo(a)	Majority
China	Zhuang nationality	Minority
China	Hui nationality	Minority
China	Uygur nationality	Minority
China	Miao nationality	Minority
China	Manchu nationality	Minority
China	Other	Minority
China	Chinese	Majority
China	Han nationality	Majority
China	East Asian Chinese	Majority
Colombia	Among all, I am black	Minority
Colombia	Among all, I am indigenous	Minority
Colombia	Among all I am mulato	Majority
Colombia	Afro-colombian	Minority
Colombia	Gypsie	Minority
Colombia	Indigenous	Minority
Colombia	Other	Minority
Colombia	Among all, I am Latine	Majority
Colombia	Among all, I am crossbreed	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Colombia	Among all, I am white	Majority
Colombia	Among all I am Colombian	Majority
Colombia	White	Majority
Cyprus	Negro Black	Minority
Cyprus	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
Cyprus	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Cyprus	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Cyprus	Other	Minority
Cyprus	Caucasian white	Majority
Czech Republic	Gypsy	Minority
Czech Republic	White	Majority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Muong	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	HMong	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Dao	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Ede	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Ray	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Thai	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Hoa	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	China	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Other	Minority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Kinh	Majority
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Viernamese	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Dominican Republic	Black	Minority
Dominican Republic	Chinese, Japanese	Minority
Dominican Republic	Arab	Minority
Dominican Republic	Other	Minority
Dominican Republic	White	Majority
Dominican Republic	Mulatto	Majority
Ecuador	Mostly i'm black	Minority
Ecuador	Above all, I am indigenous	Minority
Ecuador	Above all, I am a mulatto	Majority
Ecuador	Negro	Minority
Ecuador	Indigena	Minority
Ecuador	Montubio	Minority
Ecuador	Mulato	Minority
Ecuador	Other	Minority
Ecuador	Above all, I am Latino	Majority
Ecuador	Above all, I am mestizo	Majority
Ecuador	Mostly i'm white	Majority
Ecuador	I consider myself Ecuadorian above all	Majority
Ecuador	Blanco	Majority
Ecuador	Mestizo	Majority
Ecuador	Moreno oscuro	Majority
Ecuador	Moreno claro	Majority
Egypt	Noba	Minority
Egypt	Sudanese	Minority
Egypt	Coptic	Minority
Egypt	Other	Minority
Egypt	Arab	Majority
Egypt	From Upper Egypt	Majority
Egypt	From Nile Delta	Majority
Estonia	Causasian white	Majority
Ethiopia	Tigre	Minority
Ethiopia	Somali	Minority
Ethiopia	Afar	Minority
Ethiopia	Sidama	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Ethiopia	Wolayta	Minority
Ethiopia	Shankella	Minority
Ethiopia	Gurage	Minority
Ethiopia	Gamo	Minority
Ethiopia	Other Africans/Negro Black	Minority
Ethiopia	Other	Minority
Ethiopia	Amhara	Plurality
Ethiopia	Oromo	Plurality
Finland	Negro Black	Minority
Finland	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Finland	Otjer	Minority
Finland	Caucasian white	Majority
France	Negro Black	Minority
France	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc	Minority
France	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc	Minority
France	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
France	Mixed race	Minority
France	Caucasian white	Majority
Georgia	Other	Minority
Georgia	Georgian	Majority
Germany	Southern European	Minority
Germany	Turkish	Minority
Germany	Yugoslavian	Minority
Germany	African	Minority
Germany	Asiatic	Minority
Germany	Other	Minority
Germany	German	Majority
Germany	Caucasian White	Majority
Ghana	Frafra	Minority
Ghana	Krobo	Minority
Ghana	Ningo	Minority
Ghana	Shai	Minority
Ghana	Ada	Minority
Ghana	Kotokoli	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Ghana	Bono	Minority
Ghana	Komkomba	Minority
Ghana	Nzema	Minority
Ghana	Busanga	Minority
Ghana	Mamprugu	Minority
Ghana	Gonja	Minority
Ghana	Mampuli	Minority
Ghana	Dagari	Minority
Ghana	Bimba	Minority
Ghana	Dagomba	Minority
Ghana	Ijaw	Minority
Ghana	Esako	Minority
Ghana	Ga Afangbe	Minority
Ghana	Dagbani	Minority
Ghana	Hausa	Minority
Ghana	Guan	Minority
Ghana	Ewe	Minority
Ghana	French	Minority
Ghana	Ga-Dangme	Minority
Ghana	Other africans	Minority
Ghana	Other	Minority
Ghana	Akan	Majority
Greece	Negro Black	Minority
Greece	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
Greece	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Greece	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Greece	Other	Minority
Greece	Caucasian white	Majority
Guatemala	Indigenous	Minority
Guatemala	Ladino	Majority
Guatemala	Cross breed	Majority
Guatemala	Brown	Majority
Guatemala	White	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Guatemala	Hispanic	Majority
Haiti	White Haitian	Minority
Haiti	Mixed Race (Mullato) Haitian	Minority
Haiti	Asian/Middle Eastern	Minority
Haiti	Other	Minority
Haiti	Black	Majority
Hong Kong	Filipino	Minority
Hong Kong	Indonesian	Minority
Hong Kong	White	Minority
Hong Kong	Indian	Minority
Hong Kong	Nepalese	Minority
Hong Kong	Pakistani	Minority
Hong Kong	Thai	Minority
Hong Kong	Japanese	Minority
Hong Kong	South Asians, India, Pakistan, etc.	Minority
Hong Kong	East Asians, Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Majority
Hong Kong	Other Asian	Minority
Hong Kong	Other	Minority
Hong Kong	Chinese	Majority
Hungary	Gypsy	Minority
Hungary	Hungarian	Majority
India	Dominant Peasant Castes	Minority
India	Peasant Backward Castes	Minority
India	Weavers and Craftsman Back- ward Castes	Minority
India	Service Backward Castes	Minority
India	Muslims	Minority
India	Sikhs	Minority
India	Christians	Minority
India	Parsis	Minority
India	Jews	Minority
India	Buddhists	Minority
India	No Religion No caste	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
India	Muslims (Shiya)	Minority
India	Muslims (Sunni)	Minority
India	Muslims (Others)	Minority
India	Other Minorities	Minority
India	Hindu No Caste	Majority
India	Hindu (Scheduled Castes)	Majority
India	Hindu (Scheduled Tribes)	Majority
India	Hindu (Other Backward Castes)	Majority
India	Hindu (Upper Castes)	Majority
Indonesia	Malay	Minority
Indonesia	Chinese	Minority
Indonesia	Arab	Minority
Indonesia	Sumatranese	Minority
Indonesia	Aceh	Minority
Indonesia	Batak	Minority
Indonesia	Banjar	Minority
Indonesia	Betawi	Minority
Indonesia	Bengkulu	Minority
Indonesia	Bugis	Minority
Indonesia	Dani	Minority
Indonesia	Dayak	Minority
Indonesia	Flores	Minority
Indonesia	Lani	Minority
Indonesia	Lampung	Minority
Indonesia	Maduranese	Minority
Indonesia	Makassar	Minority
Indonesia	Mandar	Minority
Indonesia	Manggarai	Minority
Indonesia	Melayu	Minority
Indonesia	Minangkabau	Minority
Indonesia	Palembang	Minority
Indonesia	Pattae	Minority
Indonesia	Toraja	Minority
Indonesia	Kalimantan	Minority
Indonesia	Sulawesi	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Indonesia	Lombok/Sumbawa	Minority
Indonesia	Asian - East (Chinese, Japanese)	Minority
Indonesia	Asian - Central (Arabic)	Minority
Indonesia	Other	Minority
Indonesia	Javanese	Plurality
Indonesia	Sundanese	Plurality
Iran	Turk/Azeri	Minority
Iran	Kurd	Minority
Iran	Lor	Minority
Iran	Gilak/Mazani/Shomali	Minority
Iran	Baluch	Minority
Iran	Arab	Minority
Iran	Armenian	Minority
Iran	Turkman	Minority
Iran	Other	Minority
Iran	Persian	Majority
Iraq	Kurdish	Minority
Iraq	Turk	Minority
Iraq	Ashur	Minority
Iraq	Keldan	Minority
Iraq	Other	Minority
Iraq	Arab	Majority
Ireland	Asian - East (Chinese, Japanese)	Minority
Ireland	Black-Other / Black	Minority
Ireland	White / Caucasian White	Majority
Israel	Arab	Minority
Israel	Jew	Majority
Italy	Other	Minority
Italy	White	Majority
Italy	European	Majority
Japan	Caucasian (White)	Minority
Japan	Negro (Black)	Minority
Japan	South Asian (Indian)	Minority
Japan	Arabic (Central Asia)	Minority
Japan	Other	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Japan	East Asian Chinese,Japanese	Majority
Jordan	Palestine	Minority
Jordan	Syria	Minority
Jordan	Romania	Minority
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	Minority
Jordan	Afghanistan	Minority
Jordan	Egypt	Minority
Jordan	Circassian	Minority
Jordan	Chechen	Minority
Jordan	Jordan	Majority
Jordan	Arabic	Majority
Kazakhstan	Korean	Minority
Kazakhstan	Uigur	Minority
Kazakhstan	Bashkir	Minority
Kazakhstan	Lezgin	Minority
Kazakhstan	Belorus	Minority
Kazakhstan	Azeri	Minority
Kazakhstan	Iranian and Central Asian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Georgian	Minority
Kazakhstan	German	Minority
Kazakhstan	Kurdish	Minority
Kazakhstan	Kyrgyz	Minority
Kazakhstan	Moldovan	Minority
Kazakhstan	Russian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Tajik	Minority
Kazakhstan	Tatar	Minority
Kazakhstan	Ukrainian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Uzbek	Minority
Kazakhstan	Udmurt	Minority
Kazakhstan	Mordvin	Minority
Kazakhstan	Polander	Minority
Kazakhstan	Bulgarian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Azerbaijanian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Chechen	Minority
Kazakhstan	Turkish	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Kazakhstan	Dungan	Minority
Kazakhstan	Armenian	Minority
Kazakhstan	Chinese	Minority
Kazakhstan	Kazakh	Majority
Kenya	Kisii	Minority
Kenya	Maasai	Minority
Kenya	Meru	Minority
Kenya	Mijikenda	Minority
Kenya	Somalis	Minority
Kenya	Turkana	Minority
Kenya	Indians	Minority
Kenya	Asian population of Kenya (East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc)	Minority
Kenya	Arabs in Kenya (Arabic, Central Asian)	Minority
Kenya	Europeans in Kenya	Minority
Kenya	Other (write in)	Minority
Kenya	Kalenjin	Plurality
Kenya	Kamba	Plurality
Kenya	Kikuyu	Plurality
Kenya	Luhya	Plurality
Kenya	Luo	Plurality
Kyrgyzstan	Kirguis	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	European	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Tayiko	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Ruso	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Kazakh	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Asian	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbek	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Tatar	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Turkish	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	German	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Ukranian	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Dukan	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Kalmyk	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Kyrgyzstan	Uigur	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Azerbaijani	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Kurd	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Korean	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Other	Minority
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz	Majority
Latvia	Armenian	Minority
Latvia	Belorussian	Minority
Latvia	Gypsy	Minority
Latvia	Jew	Minority
Latvia	Lithuanian	Minority
Latvia	Moldovian	Minority
Latvia	Polish	Minority
Latvia	Russian	Minority
Latvia	Ukrainian	Minority
Latvia	Other	Minority
Latvia	Latvian	Majority
Lebanon	Others	Minority
Lebanon	Lebanese/Arabic	Majority
Libya	Negro Black	Minority
Libya	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc	Minority
Libya	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc	Minority
Libya	Amazigh	Minority
Libya	Tuareg	Minority
Libya	Toubou	Minority
Libya	Other	Minority
Libya	Arabic	Majority
Macao	Negro Black	Minority
Macao	Caucasian white	Minority
Macao	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
Macao	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Macao	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Macao	Portuguese/Macaense	Minority
Macao	Southeast Asians(Indonesia/Philippines/Thailand)	Minority
Macao	Other	Minority
Macao	Chinese	Majority
Malaysia	Bugis	Minority
Malaysia	Jawa	Minority
Malaysia	Brunei Malay	Minority
Malaysia	Kadazan	Minority
Malaysia	Bajau	Minority
Malaysia	Murut	Minority
Malaysia	Iban	Minority
Malaysia	Bidayuh	Minority
Malaysia	Melanau	Minority
Malaysia	Kelabit	Minority
Malaysia	Chinese	Minority
Malaysia	Rungus	Minority
Malaysia	Indian	Minority
Malaysia	Others Bumi	Minority
Malaysia	Malay	Majority
Mali	White	Minority
Mali	Asian South	Minority
Mali	Arab	Minority
Mali	Other	Minority
Mali	Black	Majority
Mexico	Black	Minority
Mexico	Indigenous	Minority
Mexico	South Asian (Indian, Pakistani)	Minority
Mexico	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese)	Minority
Mexico	Arabic (Central Asia)	Minority
Mexico	Undocumented 1	Minority
Mexico	Undocumented 2	Minority
Mexico	Indian (American)	Minority
Mexico	Other	Minority
Mexico	Coloured (medium)	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Mexico	White	Majority
Mexico	Light brown	Majority
Mexico	Dark brown	Majority
Moldova	Russian	Minority
Moldova	Ukrainian	Minority
Moldova	Gagaus	Minority
Moldova	Bulgarian	Minority
Moldova	Other	Minority
Moldova	Moldovian	Majority
Mongolia	Dorvod	Minority
Mongolia	Bayad	Minority
Mongolia	Buriad	Minority
Mongolia	Zakhchin	Minority
Mongolia	Myangad	Minority
Mongolia	Uuld	Minority
Mongolia	Kazakh	Minority
Mongolia	Tuva	Minority
Mongolia	Utguut	Minority
Mongolia	Dariganga	Minority
Mongolia	Uzemchin	Minority
Mongolia	Tsagaachid	Minority
Mongolia	Uriankhai	Minority
Mongolia	Khoton	Minority
Mongolia	Darkhad	Minority
Mongolia	Torguud	Minority
Mongolia	Khalkh	Majority
Montenegro	Caucasian	Majority
Morocco	Asie de l'est	Minority
Morocco	Berbere	Minority
Morocco	Black	Minority
Morocco	Yellow/Asian	Minority
Morocco	Arabe	Majority
Morocco	White	Majority
Myanmar	Kayin	Minority
Myanmar	Rakhine	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Myanmar	Shan	Minority
Myanmar	Mon	Minority
Myanmar	Other	Minority
Myanmar	Bamar	Majority
Netherlands	Negro Black	Minority
Netherlands	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
Netherlands	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Netherlands	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Netherlands	Asian	Minority
Netherlands	Other	Minority
Netherlands	Caucasian white	Majority
New Zealand	Maori	Minority
New Zealand	Pacific Islander	Minority
New Zealand	Asian	Minority
New Zealand	Pakeha	Majority
New Zealand	European	Majority
New Zealand	New Zealander first, ethnic group second	Majority
Nicaragua	Indigenous	Minority
Nicaragua	Afrocaribeno	Minority
Nicaragua	Other	Minority
Nicaragua	Half Blood	Majority
Nigeria	Fulani	Minority
Nigeria	Tiv	Minority
Nigeria	Ibibio	Minority
Nigeria	Frafra	Minority
Nigeria	Krobo	Minority
Nigeria	Loss	Minority
Nigeria	Bono	Minority
Nigeria	Gonja	Minority
Nigeria	Mampuli	Minority
Nigeria	Dagari	Minority
Nigeria	Bimba	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Nigeria	Dagomba	Minority
Nigeria	Yala	Minority
Nigeria	Bassa	Minority
Nigeria	Gbagi	Minority
Nigeria	Ciawa	Minority
Nigeria	Ijaw	Minority
Nigeria	Esan	Minority
Nigeria	Edo	Minority
Nigeria	Esako	Minority
Nigeria	Urhobo	Minority
Nigeria	Nupe	Minority
Nigeria	Chamba	Minority
Nigeria	Kilba	Minority
Nigeria	Higgi	Minority
Nigeria	Bachama	Minority
Nigeria	Yungur	Minority
Nigeria	Tangale	Minority
Nigeria	Bukwarra	Minority
Nigeria	Ikom	Minority
Nigeria	Ogoja	Minority
Nigeria	Boki	Minority
Nigeria	Efik	Minority
Nigeria	Ejagam	Minority
Nigeria	Baribari	Minority
Nigeria	Caucasian white	Minority
Nigeria	Negro Black	Minority
Nigeria	South Asian Indian P	Minority
Nigeria	East Asian Chinese J	Minority
Nigeria	Other Africans	Minority
Nigeria	Others	Minority
Nigeria	Yoruba	Plurality
Nigeria	Hausa	Plurality
Nigeria	Igbo	Plurality
North Macedonia	Albanian	Minority
North Macedonia	Turkish	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
North Macedonia	Roma / Gypsy	Minority
North Macedonia	Serbian	Minority
North Macedonia	Vlav	Minority
North Macedonia	Other	Minority
North Macedonia	Macedonian	Majority
Northern Ireland	White Caucasian	Majority
Pakistan	Pathan	Minority
Pakistan	Baluchi	Minority
Pakistan	Sindhi	Minority
Pakistan	Urdu speaking	Minority
Pakistan	Pashto	Minority
Pakistan	Hindko	Minority
Pakistan	Seraiki	Minority
Pakistan	Hindko	Minority
Pakistan	Others	Minority
Pakistan	Punjabi	Majority
Pakistan	Pakistani	Majority
Peru	Black or crossbreed	Minority
Peru	Asiatic or crossbreed	Minority
Peru	Indian	Minority
Peru	Arab	Minority
Peru	Indigenous / Native	Minority
Peru	Afro half-breed	Minority
Peru	Asian half-breed	Minority
Peru	Quechua	Minority
Peru	Aymara	Minority
Peru	Amazonian	Minority
Peru	Migrant of other origin	Minority
Peru	Other	Minority
Peru	White	Majority
Peru	Half-breed Andino	Majority
Peru	Half-breed Amazones	Majority
Peru	Indigenous half-breed	Majority
Peru	European half-breed	Majority
Philippines	Ilonggo	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Philippines	Bicolano	Minority
Philippines	Ilocano	Minority
Philippines	Waray	Minority
Philippines	Chabacano	Minority
Philippines	Kapampangan	Minority
Philippines	Kaulo	Minority
Philippines	Bagobo	Minority
Philippines	Chinese	Minority
Philippines	Aklanon	Minority
Philippines	Sama	Minority
Philippines	Matanao	Minority
Philippines	Bilaan	Minority
Philippines	Spanish	Minority
Philippines	Cebuano	Minority
Philippines	Zambal	Minority
Philippines	Antiqueno	Minority
Philippines	Masbateno	Minority
Philippines	Pangasinense	Minority
Philippines	Kankana-ay	Minority
Philippines	Ibaloy/Ibanag	Minority
Philippines	Tausog	Minority
Philippines	Suriganon	Minority
Philippines	Muslim	Minority
Philippines	Bagubu	Minority
Philippines	Litinya/Leyteyo	Minority
Philippines	Davaoeno/Dabawenyo	Minority
Philippines	Maranao/Matanao	Minority
Philippines	Maguindanao	Minority
Philippines	Bungolanon	Minority
Philippines	Kanglo	Minority
Philippines	Manobo	Minority
Philippines	Kulanan	Minority
Philippines	Kalagan	Minority
Philippines	Minority	Minority
Philippines	Lubano	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Philippines	Igorot	Minority
Philippines	Yakan	Minority
Philippines	Marinduque	Minority
Philippines	Ayangan (Kankanaey)	Minority
Philippines	Tinguian Tribe	Minority
Philippines	Belwang tribe	Minority
Philippines	Matinguian Tribe	Minority
Philippines	Sambal	Minority
Philippines	Mangyan	Minority
Philippines	Romblomanon	Minority
Philippines	Subanin	Minority
Philippines	Cantilangnon	Minority
Philippines	Kamayo	Minority
Philippines	Boholano	Minority
Philippines	Taga Kaulo	Minority
Philippines	Sinamah	Minority
Philippines	Other Southeast Asian	Minority
Philippines	Tagalog	Plurality
Philippines	Bisaya	Plurality
Poland	Arabic, Central Asia	Minority
Poland	Caucasic white	Majority
Puerto Rico	Black	Minority
Puerto Rico	Arabic	Minority
Puerto Rico	Mulatto	Minority
Puerto Rico	Indian	Minority
Puerto Rico	Indigenous	Minority
Puerto Rico	Other	Minority
Puerto Rico	White	Majority
Puerto Rico	Light brown	Majority
Puerto Rico	Dark brown	Majority
Republic of Korea	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc)	Majority
Romania	German	Minority
Romania	Gypsy	Minority
Romania	Hungarian	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Romania	Negro black	Minority
Romania	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Romania	Other	Minority
Romania	Romanian	Majority
Romania	Caucasian white	Majority
Russia	Tatar	Minority
Russia	Ukrainian	Minority
Russia	Belorussian	Minority
Russia	Jew	Minority
Russia	Komi	Minority
Russia	German	Minority
Russia	Kabardians	Minority
Russia	Chechen	Minority
Russia	Ingush	Minority
Russia	Balkarets	Minority
Russia	Chuvash	Minority
Russia	Mordwin	Minority
Russia	Georgian	Minority
Russia	Armenian	Minority
Russia	Mari	Minority
Russia	Udmurt	Minority
Russia	Moldovan	Minority
Russia	Englishman	Minority
Russia	Spaniard	Minority
Russia	Italian	Minority
Russia	Chinese	Minority
Russia	French	Minority
Russia	Avarets	Minority
Russia	The Assyrian	Minority
Russia	Greek	Minority
Russia	Adygean	Minority
Russia	Cherkess	Minority
Russia	Turk	Minority
Russia	Ossetian	Minority
Russia	Hakass	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Russia	Kazakh	Minority
Russia	Azeri	Minority
Russia	North-East Asian	Minority
Russia	Gypsies	Minority
Russia	Pole	Minority
Russia	Tajik	Minority
Russia	Korean	Minority
Russia	Yakut	Minority
Russia	Digorets	Minority
Russia	Latvian	Minority
Russia	Gagauz	Minority
Russia	Lezgin	Minority
Russia	Karel	Minority
Russia	Romanians	Minority
Russia	Turkmen	Minority
Russia	Tuvinec	Minority
Russia	Kyrgyz	Minority
Russia	Agul	Minority
Russia	Tabasaranec	Minority
Russia	Rutulus	Minority
Russia	Afghan	Minority
Russia	Nogayets	Minority
Russia	Andijan	Minority
Russia	Kalmyk	Minority
Russia	Cuban	Minority
Russia	Lithuanian	Minority
Russia	Abazin	Minority
Russia	Mongol	Minority
Russia	Finn	Minority
Russia	Hungary	Minority
Russia	Buryats	Minority
Russia	Lakets	Minority
Russia	Dargin	Minority
Russia	Kumyk	Minority
Russia	Czech	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Russia	Vietnamese	Minority
Russia	Uzbek	Minority
Russia	Bashkir	Minority
Russia	Karachayeva	Minority
Russia	Bulgarian	Minority
Russia	Syrian	Minority
Russia	Abkhaz	Minority
Russia	Khanty	Minority
Russia	Iranian and Central Asian	Minority
Russia	Other eastern European	Minority
Russia	Other Caucasian	Minority
Russia	Other Asian	Minority
Russia	Other	Minority
Russia	Russian	Majority
Russia	White	Majority
Rwanda	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Rwanda	African	Majority
Saudi Arabia	Egyptian	
Sudanese	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Jordanian	
Palestinian.	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Lebanese	
Syrian	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Yemeni	Minority
Saudi Arabia	Indian	
Sri Lankan	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Pakistani	
Bangladeshi	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Filipino	Minority
Saudi Arabia	Europeans	
Americans	Minority	
Saudi Arabia	Other Arabs	Minority
Saudi Arabia	Other	Minority
Saudi Arabia	Saudi	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Serbia	Montenegrin	Minority
Serbia	Yugoslav	Minority
Serbia	Hungarian	Minority
Serbia	Muslim	Minority
Serbia	Albanian	Minority
Serbia	Other	Minority
Serbia	Caucasian white	Majority
Serbia	Serbian	Majority
Singapore	Caucasian white	Minority
Singapore	South Asian Indian, Pakistan, etc.	Minority
Singapore	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Singapore	Malay	Minority
Singapore	Eurasian	Minority
Singapore	Others	Minority
Singapore	Chinese	Majority
Slovakia	Gypsy	Minority
Slovakia	Slovenian	Minority
Slovakia	Other	Minority
Slovakia	White	Majority
Slovenia	Slovenian	Majority
South Africa	White	Minority
South Africa	Coloured	Minority
South Africa	Indian	Minority
South Africa	South Asian	Minority
South Africa	East Asian	Minority
South Africa	Other	Minority
South Africa	Black	Majority
Spain	Black	Minority
Spain	South Asian Indian,	Minority
Spain	East Asian Chinese,Japanese	Minority
Spain	Arabic, Central Asia	Minority
Spain	Asian	Minority
Spain	Other	Minority
Spain	White	Majority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Sweden	African	
Black	Minority	
Sweden	South Asia (Indians, Pakistanis, etc.)	Minority
Sweden	East Asia (Chinese, Japanese, etc.)	Minority
Sweden	Arabic	
Middle East	Minority	
Sweden	From Europe, except the Nordic countries	Minority
Sweden	From Africa	Minority
Sweden	From Asia	Minority
Sweden	From North America	Minority
Sweden	From South America	Minority
Sweden	Other	Minority
Sweden	White	Majority
Sweden	Swedish	Majority
Sweden	Scandinavian; From Nordic countries	Majority
Switzerland	Swiss German	Majority
Switzerland	Swiss French	Majority
Switzerland	Swiss Italian	Majority
Taiwan	Hakka from Taiwan	Minority
Taiwan	Minnanese from Taiwan	Minority
Taiwan	Aboriginal	Minority
Taiwan	Other	Minority
Taiwan	Mainlander/China	Majority
Tajikistan	Uzbek	Minority
Tajikistan	Russian	Minority
Tajikistan	Tajik	Majority
Thailand	China	Minority
Thailand	Malayu	Minority
Thailand	Tribe	Minority
Thailand	Caucasian white	Minority
Thailand	Negro Black	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Thailand	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
Thailand	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Thailand	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Thailand	Other	Minority
Thailand	Thai	Majority
Trinidad and Tobago	Caucasian white	Minority
Trinidad and Tobago	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Trinidad and Tobago	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Trinidad and Tobago	Afro-Trinidadian	Majority
Trinidad and Tobago	Indo-Trinidadian	Majority
Trinidad and Tobago	Negro Black	Majority
Trinidad and Tobago	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Majority
Trinidad and Tobago	Other / Mixed	Minority
Tunisia	Negro Black	Minority
Tunisia	Tamazight (Berber)	Minority
Tunisia	Other	Minority
Tunisia	Arabic	Majority
Uganda	White	Minority
Uganda	Coloured	Minority
Uganda	Indian	Minority
Uganda	Other	Minority
Uganda	Black	Majority
Ukraine	Russians	Minority
Ukraine	Belarusians	Minority
Ukraine	Tatars	Minority
Ukraine	Jews	Minority
Ukraine	Pole	Minority
Ukraine	Armenian	Minority
Ukraine	Moldova	Minority
Ukraine	Rusin	Minority
Ukraine	Hungarian	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Ukraine	Georgian	Minority
Ukraine	Greek	Minority
Ukraine	Montenegrin	Minority
Ukraine	Korean	Minority
Ukraine	Bulgarian	Minority
Ukraine	Chuvash	Minority
Ukraine	Negro black	Minority
Ukraine	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc	Minority
Ukraine	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Ukraine	Other	Minority
Ukraine	Ukrainians	Majority
Ukraine	Caucasian white	Majority
United Kingdom	Black-Caribbean	Minority
United Kingdom	Black-African	Minority
United Kingdom	Black-Other	Minority
United Kingdom	Indian	Minority
United Kingdom	Pakistani	Minority
United Kingdom	Bangladeshi	Minority
United Kingdom	Chinese	Minority
United Kingdom	South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc.	Minority
United Kingdom	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
United Kingdom	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
United Kingdom	Mixed race	Minority
United Kingdom	Asian	Minority
United Kingdom	Other ethnic group	Minority
United Kingdom	White	Majority
United States of America	Black, Non-Hispanic	Minority
United States of America	Other, Non-Hispanic	Minority
United States of America	Hispanic	Minority
United States of America	Two plus, non-Hispanic	Minority
United States of America	Asian, Non-Hispanic	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
United States of America	South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc.)	Minority
United States of America	East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, etc.)	Minority
United States of America	Arabic (Central Asian)	Minority
United States of America	White, non-Hispanic	Majority
Uruguay	Black	Minority
Uruguay	South Asian (hindu, pakistani, brown)	Minority
Uruguay	East Asian (chinese, japanese, korean,..)	Minority
Uruguay	Arab (light brown)	Minority
Uruguay	Other	Minority
Uruguay	Caucasian (White)	Majority
Uzbekistan	Russian	Minority
Uzbekistan	Tatarin	Minority
Uzbekistan	Kazakhs	Minority
Uzbekistan	Karakalpak	Minority
Uzbekistan	Tajik	Minority
Uzbekistan	Kyrgyz	Minority
Uzbekistan	Turkmen	Minority
Uzbekistan	Others	Minority
Uzbekistan	Uzbek	Majority
Venezuela	Black	Minority
Venezuela	Indigenous	Minority
Venezuela	Asiatico, Chino, Japones (amarillo)	Minority
Venezuela	Other	Minority
Venezuela	White	Majority
Venezuela	Mestizo / Light brown	Majority
Venezuela	Dark-skinned / Dark-brown	Majority
Venezuela	Brown	Majority
Yemen	Caucasian white	Minority
Yemen	Negro Black	Minority

Table C1: Coding Ethnic Group Status in the World Values Survey (continued)

Country	WVS Ethnicity Category	Status Coding
Yemen	East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc.	Minority
Yemen	Arabic, Central Asian	Majority
Zambia	Caucasian white	Minority
Zambia	South Asian, Indian, Pakistani etc.	Minority
Zambia	African	Majority
Zimbabwe	Caucasian White	Minority
Zimbabwe	Coloured	Minority
Zimbabwe	Indian	Minority
Zimbabwe	Ndebele	Minority
Zimbabwe	Arabic, Central Asian	Minority
Zimbabwe	Asian, Chinese	Minority
Zimbabwe	Other	Minority
Zimbabwe	Africans/Negro Black	Majority
Zimbabwe	Shona	Majority
All Countries	Missing; Not specified	Missing
All Countries	Not asked	Missing
All Countries	Not applicable	Missing
All Countries	No answer	Missing
All Countries	Don't know	Missing